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FLORIDA NEWS ARCHIVE - JUDICIAL ETHICS, Disqualification Judge who received favorable loan rates from lender affiliated with one of the parties is disqualified from presiding over case. [Added 2/5/10] Defendant moved to disqualify a trial judge due to the judge's "alleged financial interest in the form of favorable interest rates not available to the public in the judge’s own dealings with a lender with a close corporate affiliation to the plaintiff." The judge denied the motion, and Defendant petitioned the First DCA for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court granted the petition. "This court finds that these facts, taken as true as they must be, would prompt a reasonably prudent person to fear that he or she will not obtain a fair and impartial hearing. We therefore grant the petition and direct the trial judge to enter an order of recusal, requesting that the chief circuit judge appoint a new judge to preside over the cause." Mines v. Countrywide Home Loan, Inc., __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D09-5669, 2/5/2010). NOTE: See also Canon 5D(5)(f) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct.
Judge did not err in entering final order after motion to disqualify him was filed, where order simply reduced to writing prior oral ruling. [Added 12/15/09] Judge entered a final order in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff filed motions for new trial and to vacate the judgment. Prior to the hearings on those motions, Judge (who was new to the civil bench) asked if, after the case was over, the Plaintiff's counsel "would give him some 'constructive criticism' on how he had conducted the trial." On April 17, 2009, the hearings were held. Judge denied the motion for new trial, but granted the motion to vacate, "agreeing that he had mistakenly awarded fees and costs." Judge announced that he would enter an order consistent with the oral ruling. Judge also disclosed his conversation with Plaintiff's counsel. On April 20, 2009, Plaintiff moved to disqualify Judge. On April 28, Judge entered "an amended final judgment consistent with his April 17th oral -- reserving jurisdiction on fees and costs." On April 30, Judge entered an order disqualifying himself. On May 6, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to have a successor judge reconsider the original judge's rulings. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff appealed. The Third DCA affirmed. "No miscarriage of justice occurred. It is well settled in Florida that a disqualified judge may enter orders that are part of his/her ministerial duties, including reducing to writing oral rulings made prior to a motion to disqualify[.] . . . Thus, while Judge [] may not have been authorized to enter any order on matters arising after the motion to disqualify was filed, April 20, 2009, he certainly was authorized to reduce to writing his rulings issued prior to April 20, 2009." (Emphasis in original.) Fernwoods Condominium Association #2, Inc. v. Alonso, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D09-1489, 12/9/2009).
Trial judge's "decidedly negative commentary" about party sufficient to require judge's disqualification in marriage dissolution proceeding. [Added 10/28/09] In a dissolution of marriage case, Husband filed a verified motion to disqualify the trial judge. Apparently the judge denied the motion. Seeking to prevent the judge from conducting further proceedings in the case, Husband petitioned the Third DCA for a writ of prohibition. The Third DCA granted the petition. "The judge’s decidedly negative commentary concerning his personal opinion of the petitioner’s behavior, when viewed in the context of, and at this stage of, the dissolution proceeding, is sufficient to create in a reasonably prudent person a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair hearing before this judge. See Miami Dade College v. Turnberry Inv., Inc., 979 So.2d 1211 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Valdes-Fauli [v. Valdes-Fauli] , 903 So. 2d [214] at 214 [(Fla. 3d DCA 2005)]; Kopel v. Kopel, 832 So.2d 108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002); Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. Doe, 767 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Tindle v. Tindle, 761 So.2d 424 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)." Colarusso v. Colarusso, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D09-1633, 10/21/2009).
Lawyers' campaign contributions totaling $4650 do not require disqualification of recipient judge under Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. [Added 10/2/09] DuPont's motion to disqualify a trial judge was denied. Among the grounds alleged by DuPont were that the judge received campaign contributions from lawyers representing DuPont's opposing parties. DuPont petitioned the Fourth DCA for a writ of prohibition. The appellate court denied the petition. The court noted that a lawyer's campaign contributions within lawful limits are not a legally sufficient ground for disqualification, citing MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1990). The court continued: "The contributions from attorneys in the firms representing the plaintiffs in this case were all within the statutorily permitted amounts, and the cumulative total of $4650 which the attorneys in the firms contributed to the judge’s reelection campaign does not approach the $3 million contribution at issue in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252 (2009). Contrary to DuPont’s argument, the circumstances of this case are not equivalent, or anywhere close, to those presented in Caperton." E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co. v. Acqumar S.A., __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D09-2871, 9/30/2009).
Judge who recused himself in one case due to personal relationship with parties also disqualified in separate case involving those parties. [Added 9/30/09] Judge agreed to recuse himself in one case "because of a voluntarily-revealed personal relationship with parties" in the suit. As a result, Judge "should have granted a motion for disqualification in [a] separate case involving those same parties. See Steinhorst v. State, 636 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1994); Houck v. State, 669 So.2d 1131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)." (Footnote omitted.) In a footnote, the court went on to explain: "While it is a fact that the two cases involve very similar subject matter, the same result would follow even if this were not the case. This is because the reason for the initial disqualification was the court’s relationship with the parties, not the issues in the case. See Walls v. State, 910 So.2d 432 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)." Catasus v. Tabone, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D09-1815, 9/23/2009).
Judge may "trade up" in hockey ticket exchange with lawyer- friend only if judge disqualifies him/herself from cases involving friend and friend's firm does not appear before judge. [Added 9/25/09] Judge is a hockey season ticket holder and has a "close personal friend" (a lawyer) who has access to a suite with tickets having a higher value than Judge's tickets. Occasionally Judge and the friend exchange tickets. No one in Judge's law firm appears before Judge. Judge asked the Florida Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee for an opinion concerning application of Canon 5D, regarding a judge's financial activities, to this situation. The Committee summarized the pertinent provisions of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: "Canon 5D(5)(e) permits a judge to accept gifts from close friends whose appearance in a case would otherwise require disqualification, and Canon 5D(5)(h) permits a judge to accept gifts from donors who have not and are unlikely to come before the judge. In the latter, if the aggregate value of the gift(s) in a calendar year exceeds $100.00, the judge must report the gift as required by Canon 6B(2)." The Committee noted that not all close friendships necessarily require a judge's disqualification; in some cases, disclosure of the relationship is all that is required. The Committee stated that "the inquiring judge must determine, absent the ticket exchange, whether disclosure or disqualification is the most appropriate remedy if this attorney, or anyone from the law firm, would appear before the judge." Then, "if the inquiring judge would merely disclose the relationship absent the ticket exchange, it is incumbent on the inquiring judge to refrain from accepting gifts from this lawyer/friend. However, after searching his or her conscience, if the inquiring judge determines that disqualification from any matter involving the subject lawyer/friend would be required absent the ticket exchange, then the inquiring judge may accept gifts subject to the disqualification requirement in any case involving anyone from the firm." (Emphasis in original.) Regarding the method of reporting the gift, the Committee concluded that Judge may not "offset" the value of Judge's ticket in order to reach a "net" value of the ticket exchange. "Application of an offset in determining whether a judge received a gift valued at $100.00, would allow a judge to devalue the amount of any gift received merely by giving a gift to the donor in return. To permit a judge to offset the value of any gift received by giving a gift in return would subvert the clear spirit of the Code. Accordingly, if the gift is one accepted under Canon 5D(5)(h), the inquiring judge must report the total value of the tickets received in complying with the reporting requirements of Canon 6B, without consideration of the value of the tickets exchanged." (Emphasis in original.) Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2009-16.
Error to summarily deny claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not moving to disqualify trial judge, who had previously prosecuted defendant. [Added 6/30/09] A convicted criminal Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. One ground for the motion was that counsel was ineffective because he failed to move to disqualify the trial judge. Defendant alleged that the judge, a former assistant state attorney, had previously prosecuted him in other cases when the judge. Defendant asserted that "he feared he would not receive a fair trial and that he asked his counsel to file a motion to disqualify the judge" and argued that "but for counsel's failure to file the motion, he would not have entered a plea and would have proceeded to trial." The postconviction court summarily denied the motion. The Second DCA reversed. "The fact that the presiding judge prosecuted a defendant in a previous case is sufficient to support the defendant's claim of a well-founded fear that he would not receive a fair trial before the judge. Goines v. State, 708 So.2d 656, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)." Clayton v. State, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 2d DCA, No. 2D08-d2020, 6/26/2009).
Even with parties' consent, senior judge may not preside over civil trial when judge provides mediation services in same circuit in same type of cases [Added 6//19/09] Senior Judge retired from a circuit court judgeship and currently engages in mediation in civil cases in that circuit. Senior Judge recently learned that the lawyers in a civil case over which Senior Judge presided while an active judge would like Senior Judge to preside over the trial of that case. Senior Judge has provided no mediation services to any of the lawyers or parties involved in the case. Senior Judge asked the Florida Supreme Court's Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee whether it would be ethically permissible to preside over the trial. The Committee answered in the negative, citing this portion of Canon 5F(2) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct: "A senior judge who provides mediation services shall not preside over the same type of case the judge mediates in the circuit where the mediation services are provided; however, a senior judge may preside over other types of cases (e.g., criminal, juvenile, family law, probate) in the same circuit and may preside over cases in circuits in which the judge does not provide mediation services." Because Senior Judge provides mediation for the same type of civil cases as the case in question, Canon 5F(2) is applicable. The Committee then noted that "the only remaining question is whether the consent of the parties permits the otherwise prohibited activity." The Committee concluded that "the restrictions regarding geography and subject matter set forth in Canon 5F(2) may not be waived by consent." Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2009-10.
Judge who commented regarding length of sentence before receiving presentence investigation report is disqualified. [Added 6/8/09] Criminal Defendant was found guilty. Judge ordered a presentence investigation ("PSI"). Judge asked the state how Defendant scored for sentencing purposes. Defendant was in the non-state prison category, and in fact has already been incarcerated for longer than the minimum guidelines sentence. According to the motion to disqualify later filed by Defendant, Judge "stated that he would not consider a sentence to time served, wanted the defendant to have a prison number, was not inclined to go as high as 15 years, but was talking in the range of four years or more." Based on these comments, Defendant moved to disqualify Judge. Judge denied the motion. On petition for write of certiorari, the Third DCA ruled that Judge should have granted disqualification. "[A] PSI had been ordered and the sentencing hearing was not to occur until after the PSI had been obtained. The judge made statements indicating that he had predetermined the sentence, even though the sentencing hearing had yet to be held." Judge's comments "would create a fear in the mind of a litigant that the trial judge had prejudged the sentence to be imposed" and thus disqualification was warranted. Kersaint v. State, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D09-543, 5/20/2009).
Judge whose personal situation was aligned with party's position on major issue in case is disqualified [Added 4/23/09] Defendant, a master homeowners association, was sued by Plaintiff, a sub-association within Defendant's master association. Plaintiff's suit challenged the validity of certain amendments that required all new owners in certain areas to become members of Defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. Defendant moved for rehearing, and while that motion was pending also moved to disqualify the trial judge. Disqualification was sought on the ground of "potential conflict of interest, bias, or prejudice on Judge []’s part, based on Judge []’s involvement with a similar dispute with his own homeowners association." Specifically, Defendant contended that Judge "had a personal bias and prejudice against homeowners associations with respect to mandatory club memberships, because of his own involvement in a factually similar dispute, and that he had prejudged this matter based on his prejudices and biases." Defendant attached to the motion two letters written by Judge regarding the dispute in which he had been involved. Judge denied the motion as legally insufficient. Defendant petitioned the Fourth DCA for a writ of prohibition. The appellate court granted the writ. "Rule [of Judicial Administration} 2.330(f) requires a judge to enter an order granting disqualification if the motion to disqualify is 'legally sufficient.' The motion is legally sufficient if it shows the party’s well-grounded fear that the party will not receive a fair trial. . . . It is not a question of what the judge feels, but the feeling in the mind of the party seeking to disqualify and the basis for that feeling." (Citations omitted.) Defendant also argued that disqualification was proper due, in part, to Judge's failure to disclose the facts of his dispute to the parties in the instant suit. See Canon 3E(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct ("A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification. . . .") The appellate court did not directly address this issue, but noted: "We agree that the fact that Judge []’s personal situation aligns him with the plaintiff’s position on the primary issue to be determined in this litigation supports his disqualification." The court concluded: "We find that the defendant has shown 'an actual factual foundation for the alleged fear of prejudice.' Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986). There was no need for the defendant to show proof of Judge []’s actual prejudice; it needed to show only a well-founded fear of bias. We conclude that it did so." Aberdeen Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Bristol Lakes Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D08-4467, 4/22/2009), 2009 WL 1066075.
Judge's acceptance of weekend trip to Maine from lawyer 8 years ago no longer warrants recusal from cases involving lawyer and lawyer's firm [Added 1/14/09] Eight or nine years ago Judge accepted Lawyer's invitation to spend a long weekend at Lawyer’s home in Maine. Lawyer had appeared before Judge on occasion and practices in the same area of law as the Judge’s judicial assignment. Judge intended to reimburse Lawyer for the airline tickets but never did so. Judge paid for all meals and at least some of the rental car gasoline. After the trip Judge began automatically recusing from all cases involving Lawyer and Lawyer's law firm. Judge's current social relationship with Lawyer consists of "friendly conversation at the courthouse and the exchange of e-mails on a fairly regular basis." Judge asked the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee "whether continued disqualification is required" when Lawyer appears before Judge and "whether disclosure of the judge’s subsequent voluntary standing recusal order and the reasons therefor are required even if disqualification is not." The committee answered "no" to the first question and "yes" to the second. A judge must disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including situations where the judge has a personal bias. Canon 3E(1), Florida Code of Judicial Conduct. The committee noted that the weekend trip to Maine would be considered a gift, the acceptance of which is prohibited under Canon 5D(5) unless one of the listed exceptions applies. In the committee's view, no exception applied. The committee did "not believe that these facts necessarily require disqualification under Canon 3E(1)." Both subjective and objective viewpoints must be considered in deciding whether disqualification is warranted. Subjectively, Judge must determine whether Judge believes disqualification is necessary due to personal bias. Regarding the objective test, the committee stated that there had been a sufficient passage of time so that Judge need no longer automatically recuse in cases involving Lawyer or Lawyer's firm. The committee concluded: "Under the facts provided here, the Committee concludes that the lapse of eight to nine years greatly lessens the chance that a displeased litigant will blame his or her loss on the judge’s acceptance of a gift from opposing counsel. Accordingly, so long as the judge concludes that there is no personal bias, the Committee believes that automatic recusal is no longer necessary." Turning to the disclosure question, the committee concluded that disclosure on the record of Judge's prior standing recusal order and Judge’s relationship with Lawyer is required. "The judge's obligation to disclose relevant information is broader than the duty to disqualify. In re Frank, 753 So.2d 1228, 1239 (Fla. 2000); Stevens v. American Healthcare Corp., 919 So.2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). The Commentary to Canon 3E(1) states that '[a] judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification.'" Finally, the committee adivsed that if Judge "decides to cease the practice of automatic recusal from cases involving the attorney and the attorney’s firm, the judge should either discontinue the practice of regular email with the attorney or should disclose the fact of those communications now and for some reasonable period of time after termination of the practice." Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2009-01.
Judge who pulled trigger on alleged "hair-trigger" murder weapon did not thereby become material witness or demonstrate bias [Added 11/12/08] -- The alleged murder weapon in a criminal case was asserted to have a "hair-trigger." The postconviction trial judge inspected the gun and pulled its trigger, presumably in chambers. Defendant's counsel filed a motion asserting that the judge had thereby become a material witness and demonstrated judicial bias, which should have resulted in the judge's recusal. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court disagreed with the contention that the judge should have been disqualified. "We deny relief as to this judicial-bias claim because the judge, sitting as the factfinder, merely examined an item in evidence (i.e., the Glock G30) and drew nonscientific conclusions from his manual manipulation of the weapon, which were consistent with the testimony of the firearms experts. Cf. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.400(a)(3) ('The court may permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room . . . all things received in evidence other than depositions.'). . . . Here, the judge was the factfinder during both the trial and postconviction proceedings and merely conducted 'a careful evaluation of the evidence presented' without supplying additional facts or evidence of which the parties were unaware. Further, the judge only did so after taking judicial notice of all the evidence and testimony admitted" during the defendant's trial." (Emphasis in original.) The Court continued: "In reaching this holding, we do not rely upon or endorse the extrajurisdictional precedent relied upon by [defendant], the State, or the postconviction court. We merely hold that the postconviction court’s in-camera manual manipulation of the Glock’s trigger to corroborate the claims of the firearms experts that (1) the gun was properly functioning, and (2) that the trigger pull was within the normal range, was not improper and did not display judicial bias. The judge did not engage in any independent scientific or ballistics testing. Rather, he simply held the weapon — which had been admitted into evidence — and pulled the trigger. None of his conclusions required any specialized training or knowledge beyond that which had been imparted by the testifying firearms experts; further, all of his conclusions were drawn from and supported by the testimony of these experts." (Emphasis in original.) Lynch v. State, 2 So.3d 47 (Fla. 2009) (on rehearing).
Judge's ex parte scheduling discussion with one party and denial of other party's non-yet-filed motion for continuance does not warrant judge's disqualification. [Added 11/3/08] -- Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rodriguez, 997 So.2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Judge did not err in denying a defendant's motion to disqualify him based on an unsigned sentencing order found only in the prosecution's file. [Added 10/9/08] -- Stein v. State, 995 So.2d 329 (Fla. 2008).
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee opines on disqualification issues raised when spouse of elected Public Defender presides over criminal cases. [Added 10/7/08] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2008-18.
Disqualification of circuit judge sitting in its appellate capacity is governed by standards applicable to appellate, rather than trial, judges. [Added 9/30/08] -- Clarendon National Ins. Co. v. Shogreen, 990 So.2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
All Second Circuit judges disqualified from presiding over convicted capital defendant's postconviction proceedings. [Added 9/30/08] -- Wickham v. State, 998 So.2d 593 (Fla. 2008) (revised opinion).
Judge is disqualified for stating reasons for denying legally insufficient motion seeking her disqualification. [Added 8/13/08] -- Stelzer v. Chin, 987 So.2d 785 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Florida Supreme Court amends Florida Rules of Judicial Administration concerning judicial disqualification motions. [Added 7/15/08] -- In re: Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 986 So.2d 560 (Fla. 2008).
Trial judge's remarks about hearing arguments "ad nauseum" were not legally sufficient to justify judge's disqualification. [Added 6/6/08] -- Letterese v. Brody, 985 So.2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Hearing officer should be disqualified because of her participation in action that led to proceeding over which she presided. [Added 5/17/08] -- Jones v. Florida Keys Community College, 984 So.2d 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Judge not disqualified for remarks in connection with petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel him to set case for trial and response filed by judge after he denied motion to disqualify him. [Added 4/14/08] -- Rolle v. Birken, 984 So.2d 534 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee addresses questions raised when judge's adult child seeks employment at law firm with cases that will come before judge. [Added 3/27/08] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2008-06 (March 17, 2008).
Timeliness of motion to disqualify judge is measured from when movant "actually discovered" information prompting motion, per Florida Supreme Court. [Added 2/21/08] -- Doorbal v. State, 983 So.2d 464 (Fla. 2008).
Judge's recusal in one case due to difficult relationship with assistant state attorney does not preclude judge from presiding over cases involving other lawyers from same office. [Added 2/21/08] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2008-04 (February 15, 2008).
Judge's recusal required in cases where judge's former fiance is involved as forensic accounting expert. [Added 2/19/08] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2008-03 (February 13, 2008).
Florida Supreme Court rules that circuit court's order on petition for writ of prohibition filed after motion to disqualify County court judge was denied is reviewable by certiorari rather than direct appeal. [Added 2/4/08] -- Sutton v. State, 975 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2008).
Judge's reputation for certain sentencing practices is not legally sufficient ground for judge's disqualification. [Added 1/14/08] -- Williams v. State, 987 So.2d 1 (Fla. 2008).
Judge disqualified from presiding over criminal trial due to "hostile remarks" directed at alleged victim's lawyer. [Added 12/30/07] -- State v. Alzate, 972 So.2d 226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Judge not disqualified as result of campaign contribution made by judge's spouse to political opponent of criminal defendant's lawyer. [Added 12/9/07] -- Phillips v. State, 971 So.2d 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee addresses when judge should make disclosure or be disqualified from cases involving lawyers on judge's campaign committee. [Add 11/27/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-17.
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee backs away from "bright line" rule on disqualification of judge in all cases where judge's relative is employed by a law firm. [Added 10/17/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-16.
Judge disqualified from all cases involving law firm that employs judge's spouse as paralegal. [Added 10/2/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-14.
Judge's comments on the merits of the case before pleadings were filed warranted judge's disqualification. [Added 9/28/07] -- NRD Investments, Inc. v. Velazquez, 965 So.2d 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Judge disqualified from presiding over Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 hearing where movant's trial counsel had hired judge's spouse as an expert witness multiple times. [Added 8/31/07] -- Aurigemma v. State, 964 So.2d 224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Judge disqualified based on allegations that counsel for one party represented judge's "girlfriend" in unrelated case; no distinction between "girlfriend" and spouse for disqualification purposes. [Added 8/9/07] -- Baez v. Koelemij, 960 So.2d 918 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007.)
Judges whose family members work for sheriff's department not disqualified from all cases involving sheriff's department. [Added 7/20/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-11.
Motion to disqualify judge must be sworn to by moving party, not moving party's lawyer. [Added 7/20/07] -- Platman v. State, 961 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
Judge's negative comments about juvenile during delinquency proceeding grounds for judge's disqualification. [Added 7/18/07] -- J.R. v. State, 959 So.2d 833 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
"Bright-line" rule requires that judicial disqualification motion be deemed granted because judge did not ensure it was ruled on within 30 days. [Added 6/15/07] -- Schisler v. State, 958 So.2d 503 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Judge who leases office building to local legal aid agency is disqualified whenever lawyers from that agency appear before judge. [Added 5/21/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-10.
Judge properly denied, as legally insufficient, motion to disqualify her on ground that she previously had "some prosecutorial involvement" in securing presence of key witness against defendants. [Added 5/1/07] -- Dendy v. State, 954 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Judge's disqualification not required based on alleged ex parte communication, but Florida Supreme Court cautions judges to be careful in this area. [Added 4/20/07] -- Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298 (Fla. 2007).
Judge disqualified from presiding over suit, where judge's father had at least an indirect economic interest in the dispute. [Added 4/13/07] -- Corie v. City of Riviera Beach, 954 So.2d 68 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Motion to disqualify judge from presiding over postconviction proceeding based on allegedly vindictive sentence imposed at trial timely if raised at first opportunity in postconviction proceeding (and was legally sufficient). [Added 4/9/07] -- St. Pierre v. State, 966 So.2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Judge disqualified from presiding over violation of probation proceeding based on statement that could create well grounded fear that judge predetermined sentence. [Added 4/7/07] -- Dorch v. State, 952 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).
Judge's statement in one case allegedly likening defendant to Charles Manson does not require judge's disqualification in other case involving defendant, absent showing of judge's actual bias. [Added 3/21/07] -- Howard v. State, 950 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
Trial judge who commented regarding possible suitability of death penalty in case involving 65-year old defendant is disqualified. [Added 2/26/07] -- State v. Ballard, 956 So.2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA, 2007).
Judge who is beneficiary of land trust disqualified from cases involving co-beneficiary lawyers (and their law firms); consequently, judge should divest self of interest in trust. [Added 2/13/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-02.
Part-time traffic magistrates may rent space from law firm that handles traffic cases, but may not work on firm's cases without incurring disqualification. [Added 1/30/07] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2007-01.
Judge who prosecuted defendant years ago should not rule on defendant's postconviction motions. [Added 12/20/06] -- Penoyer v. State, 945 So.2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Successor judge who replaced recused judge not required to reconsider rulings made by recused judge. [Added 12/8/06] -- Rath v. Network Marketing, L.C., 944 So.2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
When trial court decides judicial disqualification motion on grounds other than timeliness, then issue of timeliness is not properly before reviewing appellate court. [Added 12/3/06] -- Santa Catalina Townhomes, Inc. v. Mirza, 942 So.2d 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (en banc).
Judge disqualified for statements concerning party that judge made in previous, unrelated case. [Added 12/1/06] -- B.M. v. State, 943 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee renders 2 opinions concerning judge's disqualification when law firm employing judge's son appears in cases involving judge. [Added 11/9/06] -- Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2006-26; Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2006-27.
Judge's public statement against domestic violence not legally sufficient ground for disqualification in criminal case, per Florida Supreme Court. [Added 11/2/06] -- Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655 (Fla. 2006).
Judge's expression of frustration with lawyer's attempts to withdraw from difficult client was not legally sufficient reason for judge's disqualification. [Added 10/24/06] -- Fondura v. State, 940 So.2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Untimely and otherwise legally insufficient motion to disqualify trial judge nevertheless results in disqualification due to judge's comments in ruling on motion. [Added 8/23/06] -- Dominguez v. State, 944 So.2d 1052 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
Trial judge's 18-month delay in rendering final judgment not legally sufficient ground for disqualification. [Added 7/13/06] -- Rawson v. UMLIC VP, L.L.C., 933 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).
Special Master not disqualified for commenting regarding party's actions in court filings. [Added 7/5/06] -- Pasteur Medical Center, Inc. v. Wellcare of Florida, Inc., 943 So.2d 144 (Fla. 2006).
Judge's "vented frustration" comments at one party do not require disqualification. [Added 6/14/06] -- St. Fleur v. St. Fleur, 929 So.2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
Judge who personally represented party to case before her during time period incident at issue occurred is disqualified. [Added 5/19/06] -- Brown v. Graham, 931 So.2d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
No specific language required in order for judge's order of recusal to be effective. Goolsby v. State, 914 So.2d 494 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
Judge must recuse from all cases (including uncontested matters) involving lawyers from firm judge hired to represent him. Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2005-15.
Disparaging remarks allegedly made by JCC's judicial assistant to party's lawyer not ground for JCC's disqualification. Leone v. F.J.M. Construction, 911 So.2d 1285 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Judge may not reconsider order of disqualification signed in error. Jenkins v. Motorola, Inc., 911 So.2d 196 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
ALJ erred by ruling on merits of disqualification motion; disqualification ordered. Lee Memorial Health System v. Fla. Agency for Health Care Administration, 910 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
Judge who recused from one case due to adversarial relationship with lawyer disqualified from other case involving that lawyer. Walls v. State, 910 So.2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Disqualification not required where movant did not allege objective basis for fear of judicial bias. Scott v. State, 909 So.2d 364 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).
Motion to vacate disqualified judge's rulings waived if not filed within 20 days of disqualification order. Weiss v. Berkett, 907 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
Judge's negative comments to lawyer in 2001 grounds for disqualification in 2005. Gonzalez v. State, 896 So.2d 965 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Disqualified judge remains disqualified even after reason for disqualification has disappeared. Cusimano v. Florio, 900 So.2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Judge often must disclose spouse's business relationship with lawyer when presiding over cases handled by lawyer's firm. Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2005-06.
Judge who regularly represented certain clients must disclose existence of that relationship even after 4 years on bench. Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2005-05.
Judge not disqualified from cases in which party's lawyer was on 34-member steering committee for judge's election opponent. Braynen v. State, 895 So.2d 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Trial court's credibility determination adverse to defendant in another case not legally sufficient ground for disqualification. Kokal v. State, 901 So.2d 766 (Fla. 2005).
Judge who remarked that he thought party would flee country before next hearing should be disqualified. Cabada v. Costelloe, 888 So.2d 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Disqualification warranted where court called wife "alimony drone" and "woman scorned" and moved up trial date despite wife's request for continuance. Valdes-Fauli v. Valdes-Fauli, 903 So.2d 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
Supreme Court amends procedural rules governing judicial disqualification motions. Amendments to Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.160, 885 So.2d 870 (Fla. 2004) (movants required to "serve" judge with copy of motion (current rule says "send"); any motion for disqualification must be reduced to writing and "promptly filed;" judge must rule on motion to disqualify "immediately, but no later than 30 days after the service of the motion;" if not ruled on within 30 days, motion "shall be deemed granted and the moving party may seek an order from the court directing the clerk to reassign the case").
Judge's disqualification warranted where lawyer for petitioning party had personally represented judge in another matter. City of Fort Lauderdale v. Palazzo Las Olas Group, LLC, 882 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Judge's comments at hearing giving appearance of pre-judgment of issue not before judge at hearing warranted disqualification. Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So.2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Motion to disqualify appellate judge due to prior, allegedly incorrect adverse rulings denied as legally insufficient. Adams v. Smith, 884 So.2d 287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Judge who recused self in one case due to friendship with lawyer, and did not disclose or recuse in later case, disqualified from later case. Mulligan v. Mulligan, 877 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Disqualification warranted when trial judge in custody dispute invited children to contact her without parents' knowledge. Frengel v. Frengel, 880 So.2d 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Judge's initiation of plea dialogue and manner of discussing sentencing alternatives warranted disqualification. Pierce v. State, 873 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Judge who did not give ex-husband full opportunity to present defense to contempt motion and relied on prior hearings with husband in making decision should have granted disqualification motion. Swida v. Raventos, 872 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Judge who interviewed child in custody case with only one parent present disqualified for ex parte communication. Pearson v. Pearson, 870 So.2d 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
Judge's comments on witnesses and counsel in one case does not require disqualification in other cases involving same party. [Added 3/19/04] -- City of Hollywood v. Witt, 868 So.2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
Filing suit against trial judge does not of itself create legally sufficient ground for disqualification. May v. South Florida Water Management District, 866 So.2d 205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).
2 years acceptable length of time for judge's recusal from cases involving members of judge's former law firm; disclosure, but not disqualification, required when judge's cousins appear as lawyers before judge. Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Opinion 2004-06.
Judge should disqualify self from cases involving lawyer (or member of lawyer's firm) with whom judge has close social relationship and who has served and will again serve as judge's campaign treasurer. Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Opinion 2004-01.
Negative personal exchanges between party's lawyers and judge before judge took bench sufficient to give party reasonable fear that he would not receive fair and impartial trial. [Added 12/1/03] -- Siegel v. State, 861 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Judge's independent quest for information leads to disqualification. Chillingworth v. State, 846 So.2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). See also Inquiry Concerning a Judge (Joseph P. Baker), 813 So.2d 36 (Fla. 2002) (judge was admonished by the Supreme Court of Florida for independent investigation in violation of Canon 3B(7). |
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