Court properly declined to disqualify former prosecutor from representing defendant, where lawyer had not substantially participated in defendant's prosecution.  [Added 3/2/10]

    Lawyer was in charge of the investigative unit of the statewide prosecutor's office in Broward County.  While Lawyer was in that position, the office apparently investigated Defendant's activities.  Four years after Lawyer left the statewide prosecutor's office, Defendant was charged.  Lawyer now represents Defendant in defending those charges.

    The state moved to disqualify Lawyer, asserting that Lawyer "had substantial participation in this case as a prosecutor."  The trial court denied the motion, finding after an evidentiary hearing that Lawyer did not have substantial participation in the case while with the prosecutor's office.  "[Lawyer] had limited involvement as a prosecutor regarding a co-defendant’s bond hearing in another case; names of some witnesses in the current case appeared in notes she took during staff meetings, but with no information related to the present cases; she represented the state at a hearing when two witnesses entered pleas; and she sat in for another prosecutor at a meeting with law enforcement regarding a co-defendant who could become a state witness."

    The state also was unsuccessful in its contention that Lawyer should be disqualified for a "playbook" reason, "because because her employment with the task force gave her insight on the state’s strategy and position."  The state, however, "did not point to any specific strategic insight or confidential information [Lawyer] would have."

    The state petitioned for a writ of certiorari.  The Fourth DCA denied the petition.

    The appellate court observed that "[a]lthough the state has cited civil cases supporting its contention that disqualification is necessary, the test for disqualification of counsel in a civil case does not apply in a criminal case where the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are involved."  (Citations omitted.)  The court explained:  "Although there is a presumption in favor of the defendant’s choice of counsel, the presumption may be overcome if the there is a showing of an actual conflict or 'serious potential for conflict.'  Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988); see also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1994).  In moving for disqualification of counsel, the state has the burden of overcoming this presumption.  See State v. Ehlers, 631 N.W.2d 471, 481 (Neb. 2001) (concluding the trial court erred in applying presumptions in favor of disqualification that apply in civil cases to disqualification of chosen counsel in a criminal case and concluding the burden of proof should be on the state)."  In the instant case, "the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that [Lawyer] had not obtained confidential information nor had the state proved that her work with the government four years earlier would provide her with an advantage in this case."  Disqualification was properly denied.  State v. de la Osa, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D09-5003, 2/24/2010).

    NOTE:  Although not mentioned in the court's opinion, the result appears to be consistent with Rule 4-1.11(a), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides:  "A lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:  (1) is subject to rule 4-1.9(b); and (2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation."

Law firm disqualified based on unfair informational or tactical advantage obtained through receipt of opposing party's privileged materials.  [Added 2/12/10]

    Mother and Father were opposing parties in contentious paternity litigation.  Mother came into possession of a USB flash drive belonging to Father.  The drive contained "the electronic equivalent of thousands of pages of documents and communications" that included attorney-client communications between Father and his lawyer, attorney-client work product, and confidential medical, financial, and business information relating to Father.  After "illegally obtain[ing]" the flash drive, Mother took it to Law Firm.  Law Firm spent "in excess of 100 hours reviewing its contents 'although it was apparent within moments of inspection that it belonged to the Father and contained attorney/client communications with the Father's current counsel . . ., as well as a complete history and chronology of strategy, work product, and confidential communications spanning the near decade-long period of this litigation.'"

    Father moved to disqualify Mother's Law Firm.  The trial court granted the motion, in addition to ordering other things such as return of the flash drive and any copies of the documents, removal of the information from Law Firm's and Mother's computers, and so forth.  Mother petitioned the Fifth DCA for a writ of certiorari, seeking to quash the disqualification order.  Mother contended that the remedies short of disqualification ordered by the trial court were sufficient.

    The appellate court denied the petition.  "While recognizing that disqualification of a party's chosen counsel is an extraordinary remedy that should be resorted to sparingly, disqualification is appropriate where a party obtains an unfair informational or tactical advantage through the disclosure of privileged information to that party's counsel.  . . .  Given the nature of the information obtained by the Firm from the USB drive, it cannot be reasonably disputed that an informational and tactical advantage was obtained by the Mother."  (Citations omitted.)

    The court concluded with a cautionary point:  "For the benefit of other attorneys facing a similar dilemma, we note that the Florida Bar Commission [sic] on Professional Ethics has opined that when an attorney receives confidential documents he or she knows or reasonably should know were wrongfully obtained by his client, he or she is ethically obligated to advise the client that the materials cannot be retained, reviewed, or used without first informing the opposing party that the attorney and/or client have the documents at issue.  If the client refuses to consent to disclosure, the attorney must withdraw from further representation.  Fla. Bar Prof'l Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 07-1."  Castellano v. Winthrop, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 5th DCA, No. 5D09-2798, 1/29/2010), 2010 WL 322177.

Disqualification of party's law firm was premature where party not allowed to present evidence refuting movant's claims.  [Added 2/10/10]

    In a dissolution of marriage case, Husband moved to disqualify Wife's counsel.  Husband alleged that Wife "hacked" into his email account and obtained a message from Husband to his lawyer.  Wife's sister sent the email to Wife's lawyer, who "recognized that the e-mail was an attorney-client communication, and sent the husband’s attorney a letter returning the email."  Nevertheless, Husband moved to disqualify Wife's lawyer on the basis that Wife allegedly obtained an unfair advantage justifying disqualification.

    The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.  After opening arguments, Husband presented evidence.  Wife's counsel pointed out that the court had not allowed the Wife to present evidence regarding how she obtained the email.  The court never allowed testimony on the issue and issued its ruling.  "The court responded that it did not know whether the wife’s testimony would make a difference.  The court explained that, even if it accepted the wife’s argument that the husband failed to protect the e-mail, the harm occurred when the wife had the email forwarded to her attorney.  The court then found that the only remedy was to grant the motion disqualifying the wife’s attorneys."  Seeking to quash the order, Wife petitioned the Fourth DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The appellate court granted the petition and quashed the order, agreeing that Wife did not receive due process.  "The wife’s evidence may have been relevant to her argument that the husband failed to treat the e-mail as confidential and waived any privilege claim over it.  . . .  The wife’s evidence also may have been relevant to whether the wife acted in bad faith in discovering and forwarding the e-mail.  . . .  Even if the wife’s evidence would not have impressed the court, a party has the right to present evidence and to argue the case at the conclusion of all the testimony.  . . .  Thus, it is necessary to grant the wife’s petition, quash the order disqualifying her counsel, and remand for continuation of the hearing, at which the wife may present her evidence."  (Citations omitted.)

    The court also commented on other non-dispositive grounds raised by Wife "as they may repeat themselves on remand."  On remand, the trial court "should determine whether the husband treated the e-mail as confidential and, if so, whether the wife gained an unfair advantage in discovering it and having it forwarded to her attorney.  If the court determines that the wife gained an unfair advantage, then disqualification of the wife’s attorneys may be appropriate.  Regardless of whether the wife gained an unfair advantage, however, disqualification and other sanctions still may be appropriate under the 'inequitable conduct doctrine' if the court finds that the wife, in bad faith, discovered the e-mail and had it forwarded to her attorney.  If disqualification is not appropriate, the court can consider lesser remedies, such as precluding any discovery based on the e-mail’s contents, precluding the use of the email at trial, or both."  (Footnote omitted.)  Minakan v. Husted, __ So.3d ___ (Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D09-4439, 1/20/2010), 2010 WL 174333.

Conflict rule governing concurrent representation of clients (RPC 4-1.7) does not permit analysis of whether conflict is "material."  [Added 1/14/10]

    Claimant filed petitions for workers' compensation benefits against both Lincoln/Guarantee and Wentworth/Summit.  Each denied responsibility, with Lincoln/Guarantee alleging that Claimant was a borrowed servant of Wentworth and Wentworth/Summit alleging that Claimant was an employee of Lincoln.  Law Firm represented Wentworth/Summit.  About two months before the final hearing, Guarantee retained Law Firm "to participate in an audit of Lincoln to determine whether the claimant was listed in Lincoln’s payroll submissions and to locate the owner of Lincoln."  When Lincoln/Guarantee's lawyer learned that Law Firm was representing Guarantee, he moved to disqualify Law Firm from representing Wentworth/Summit in the workers' compensation case.  The Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC") denied the motion, ruling that there was no material conflict.  Lincoln/Guarantee petitioned the First DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The First DCA granted the petition and vacated the order denying disqualification.  "Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.7 forbids a lawyer from representing two clients in the same matter unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the responsibilities to each client and each client consents in writing or on the record.  To disqualify a law firm from concurrently representing a  party whose interests are adverse, a client need only show that an attorney/client relationship exists."  Law Firm conceded that it represented both Lincoln/Guarantee and Wentworth/Summit at the same time.  "[T]he JCC erred in finding that the conflict had to be material.  Rule 4-1.7 leaves no room for a 'materiality' analysis.  When [Law Firm] failed to prove it had the written consent from each client, and failed to prove that the representation of both clients would not adversely affect the responsibilities to each client, the JCC should have granted the motion to disqualify."

    The appellate court quoted the explanation of Fifth DCA in Harvey E. Morse, P.A. v. Clark, 890 So.2d 496, 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), that Rule 4-1.7 is "based on the ethical-concept requirement that a lawyer should act with undivided loyalty for his client and not place himself or herself in a position where a conflicting interest may affect the obligations of an ongoing professional relationship.  . . .  Such unseemly conduct, if permitted, would further erode the public’s regard for the legal profession."  Lincoln Associates & Construction, Inc. v. Wentworth Construction Co., Inc., __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly D149 (Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D09-2268, 1/12/2010), 2010 WL 90477.

Trial court erred in disqualifying lawyer who would be called as witness by opposing party without determining whether lawyer's testimony would be adverse to her client.  [Added 11/15/09]

    Plaintiff sued Defendant in an action arising from contracts for equipment.  Lawyer represented Defendant in the litigation and on other matters.  Plaintiff moved to disqualify Lawyer from the litigation.  Although 3 grounds were alleged, the trial court entered an order of disqualification based only on the ground that Lawyer "will be a necessary and material witness;" specifically, "the circuit court found that [Lawyer] 'may very well be a material witness by having injected herself into the business dealings out of which this dispute arises.'"  Seeking to quash the disqualification order, Defendant petitioned the Second DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The appellate court granted the petition and quashed the order.  "The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar do not mandate an attorney's  automatic disqualification when he or she is called to testify by an opposing party.  [AlliedSignal Recovery Trust v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)] at 680; see R. Regulating Fla. Bar. 4-3.7(a) ('A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness on behalf of the client.' (emphasis added)).  . . .  Instead, an attorney that will be called as a witness by an opposing party may be disqualified if the attorney's testimony will 'be 'sufficiently adverse to the factual assertions or account of events offered on behalf of the client.'' AllliedSignal Recovery Trust, 934 So.2d at 679 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. English, 588 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)).  We have explained that '[t]he requirement that a lawyer withdraw when he expects to be a witness was not intended to permit an opposing party to call him as a witness and disqualify him from serving as counsel.'  Id. at 680."

    The court distinguished Fleitman v. McPherson, 691 So.2d 37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), on the ground that in Fleitman the lawyer "will be testifying on behalf of his or her own client."

    The court concluded:  "It follows that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it disqualified [Defendant]'s attorney without determining whether [Lawyer]'s testimony would be adverse to [Defendant]'s factual assertions or account of events.  Thus we grant the petition and quash the order disqualifying [Lawyer] as [Defendant]'s counsel.  The circuit court should reconsider [Plaintiff]'s motion in light of the correct standard."  Alto Construction Co. v. Flagler Construction Equipment, LLC, 22 So.3d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court properly denied motion to disqualify law firm based on alleged conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty grounds.  [Added 11/5/09]

    Husband and Wife ("Plaintiffs") filed a personal injury suit against Defendants.  Plaintiffs moved to disqualify Defendants' counsel ("Law Firm") on several grounds:  (1) Plaintiffs alleged that one of Law Firm's lawyers owed Husband a fiduciary duty because Husband is a beneficiary of an estate in which the lawyer represents the personal representative; (2) Law Firm had an unfair informational advantage in the suit because Plaintiffs revealed information about the case to their neighbor's relatives, apparently without knowing that the neighbor was a lawyer who represented a party adverse to Husband in the probate matter, and that the neighbor-lawyer "passed 'a direct pipeline for information and cooperation' relating to their case to the Firm, which created a conflict and gave [Defendants] an unfair advantage in the" personal injury suit.

    The trial court denied Plaintiffs' motion to disqualify.  Plaintiffs petitioned the Second DCA for a writ of certiorari.  The appellate court denied the petition, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to disqualify Law Firm.

    Regarding the conflict of interest allegation, the court first pointed out that Plaintiffs had never had an attorney-client relationship with Law Firm.  "Because no attorney-client relationship existed between [Plaintiffs] and the Firm, [Plaintiffs]] failed to meet the threshold requirement for  disqualification based on a conflict of interest.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.7 (discussing conflict of interest  pertaining to current clients); 4-1.9 (discussing conflict of interest pertaining to former clients).  [Husband] conceded that the Firm was always an adversary to him."

    The court also rejected as "without merit" Plaintiffs' argument that Law Firm should be disqualified because the Firm owed Husband a fiduciary duty arising from the separate probate matter.  "Even if there were some type of fiduciary duty relating to the administration of the estate, that relationship does not create an attorney-client relationship requiring disqualification.  See In re Estate of Gory, 570 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (holding that if counsel for the personal representative of an estate owes a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries, '[t]his does not mean . . . that counsel and the beneficiaries occupy an attorney-client relationship' because the comments to rule 4-1.7 state that 'the personal representative is the client rather than the estate or the beneficiaries')."

    The court also rejected Plaintiffs regarding Law Firm's alleged access to confidential information through their neighbor:  (1) Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality regarding the conversations; (2) Plaintiffs "were not engaged in an attorney-client relationship with the neighbor, his relatives, or the Firm;" and (3) "the Rules of Professional Conduct addressing the use of information to the disadvantage of another party only contemplate situations where information is gained from and used against a prior or current client.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.8(b) ('A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client . . .'); 4-1.9(b) (stating that a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter 'use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except . . . when the information has become generally known.')."

    Finally, the court pointed out that Law Firm did not actually have access to confidential documents and information in the probate matter.  Kaplan v. Divosta Homes, L.P., 20 So.3d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to compel deposition of plaintiff's counsel.  [Added 9/14/09]

    Plaintiff was injured in an auto accident and hired Lawyer to represent her.  Plaintiff was treated by Doctor.  Doctor's billing and payment for Plaintiff's treatment was handled outside of Plaintiff's insurance coverage, and was handled by Lawyer's office.  Sometime later it was determined that Doctor may have been within Plaintiff's insurance plan.  Plaintiff sued Doctor "alleging damages stemming from [Doctor]'s failure to bill [Plaintiff] through the insurance network rather than through the independent arrangement."

    Doctor sought to depose Lawyer, alleging that he had non-privileged information about the billing arrangements.  Plaintiff sought a protective order, which the trial court orally granted.  Doctor then filed 2 motions:  a motion to compel Lawyer's deposition; and a motion to disqualify Lawyer from representing Plaintiff on the ground that Lawyer would be a necessary witness at trial.  The trial court denied both motions, "specifically stating that the two motions 'go hand in hand'."  Doctor petitioned the Second DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The writ was granted in part and denied in part.  The court concluded that the trial court had not departed from the essential requirements of law in denying the motion to disqualify.  The record did not show that Lawyer had been listed as a witness by either party.  (The court noted that Doctor would be able to renew his motion to disqualify in the event that Lawyer was listed as a witness.)

    The trial court did err, however, in denying the motion to compel Lawyer's deposition.  The issues in the 2 motions were "distinguishable," and so the trial court should have considered the motions separately.  Under the circumstances, Lawyer appeared to be a potential material witness.  The appellate court recognized that "while deposing opposing counsel is fraught with concern," it noted that "there is no absolute prohibition to the practice."  The court further observed that, "[c]ase law specifically suggests that in certain instances the taking of a deposition of opposing counsel should be allowed in order to determine whether a motion to disqualify that counsel should ultimately be granted" (citing Quality Air Conditioning Co. v. Vrastil, 895 So.2d 1236, 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), and Singer Island Ltd. v. Budget Constr. Co., 714 So.2d 651, 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)).  The court concluded:  "Because the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in failing to use the correct analysis for determining whether to deny the motion to depose [Lawyer], and because [Doctor] would have no adequate remedy on appeal, we grant the petition with regard to [Doctor]'s motion to depose."  Nucci v. Simmons, 20 So.3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Postconviction court should have appointed counsel after defendant claimed conflict with his lawyer, who had since left public defender's office.  [Added 8/14/09]

    A convicted criminal Defendant moved for postconviction relief under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850.  The motion was denied and Defendant appealed.  The Second DCA reversed for a new evidentiary hearing at which Defendant would be represented by court-appointed conflict-free counsel.

    After Defendant's trial his lawyer, an assistant public defender, left the public defender's office to work for the state attorney's office.  Defendant filed a motion to "withdraw and terminate counsel" in which he contended that his new lawyer, also an assistant public defender, was not properly prepared and was not keeping Defendant informed.  Defendant asserted that "he had a conflict of interest with the entire Public Defender's Office because [his former lawyer] had worked there and because he had filed bar complaints against other attorneys with the Public Defender's Office."  The court did not grant Defendant's request for conflict-free counsel who was not from the public defender's office.  Instead, Defendant represented himself.

    On appeal Defendant argued that "the postconviction court erred in denying his request for conflict-free counsel because his position in the postconviction motion was adverse to former assistant public defender [his former lawyer]."  The Second DCA agreed and reversed for a new evidentiary hearing.  The court noted that "[t]he Public Defender's Office has a conflict precluding representation of a defendant who files a motion for postconviction relief containing allegations of ineffective assistance of a public defender that require an evidentiary hearing.  Adams v. State, 380 So.2d 421, 422 (Fla. 1980)."  The court continued:  "The issue before the postconviction court in this case was whether the Public Defender's Office has such a conflict when the assistant public defender that is the subject of the postconviction motion is no longer with the Public Defender's Office.  [Defendant] correctly argues that Fletcher v. State, 890 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), is squarely on point.  In Fletcher, as in this case, the petitioner requested conflict-free counsel to represent him at an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 1168.  The postconviction court denied the request based on its finding that the petitioner's trial counsel was no longer with the Public Defender's Office.  The Fifth District reversed, finding that the petitioner was entitled to conflict-free counsel.  Id. at 1170.  The court explained, 'While there is no right to counsel in postconviction proceedings, once the court determined that Fletcher was entitled to counsel, it should have appointed conflict-free counsel.'  Id. (citation omitted)."  Howard v. State, 17 So.3d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify entire State Attorney's Office after it hired lawyer who had been representing defendant on his criminal case.  [Added 7/25/09]

    Criminal Defendant was represented by Lawyer.  After representing Defendant for 5 months, Lawyer withdrew and accepted a position with the Monroe County State Attorney's Office.  At the State Attorney's Office Lawyer was "fully screened from the defendant's prosecution" and "did not discuss the case with any of his colleagues or supervisors."  Defendant moved to disqualify the entire Monroe County State Attorney's Office.  The trial court denied the motion, the case was tried, and Defendant was convicted.  On appeal he contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying the disqualification motion.

    The Third DCA affirmed.  "[B]oth [Lawyer] and [Lawyer's supervisor at the State Attorney's Office, who was the prosecutor assigned to Defendant's case] offered clear and uncontroverted testimony establishing that they never discussed the defendant’s case, no confidential information was exchanged, and [Lawyer] did not see the file or assist in the prosecution of the case in any capacity.  In addition, [Lawyer] instructed his assistant at the State Attorney’s Office to screen him from all correspondence involving this case, and to keep it from his view.  Finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice, and that [Lawyer] (who was obviously disqualified) had been fully screened from his former client’s prosecution, the trial court denied the motion and allowed the case to proceed."  The trial court did not err in denying the motion.  The appeals court concluded:  "While [Lawyer]'s 'switching of sides' likely left the defendant with a regrettable sting, in the absence of actual prejudice, disqualification of the entire State Attorney’s Office was not required.  See State v. Fields, 954 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that in the absence of actual prejudice, the disqualification of an entire State Attorney’s Office constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law)."  Lot v. State, 13 So.3d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Neither trial counsel's personal dislike of client nor client's filing of Bar complaint resulted in ineffective assistance.  [Added 7/15/09]

    A convicted criminal Defendant under a death sentence moved for postconviction relief pursuant Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.851.  The trial court denied the petition.  Defendant appealed.

    The Florida Supreme Court affirmed.  One of Defendant's grounds for alleged ineffective assistance of counsel related to his relationship with counsel.  Defendant contended that the trial court "erred in summarily denying his claim that he was not represented by conflict-free counsel based on trial counsel's personal dislike of him and based on the fact that [Defendant] filed a Bar complaint against trial counsel.  The Supreme Court pointed out that "[b]oth aspects of [Defendant]'s claim have been addressed and decided adversely to his position."  Although the Constitution guarantees counsel to an accused, it does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between the two.  See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983). 

    Furthermore, "the filing of a Bar complaint does not per se constitute a conflict of interest.  See Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852, 861 (Fla. 2007) (denying relief on conflict of interest claim because while defendant alleged conflict of interest based on the fact that he filed a Florida Bar grievance against his counsel, he failed to allege or demonstrate how the alleged conflict impacted counsel‘s performance at the competency hearing).  The Court went on to reject Defendant's claim that the filing of the Bar complaint adversely affected counsel's performance.  "Accordingly, [Defendant] fails to establish any correlation between his filing of a Bar complaint against trial counsel and counsel‘s decisions during the trial. Because a conflict of interest has not been demonstrated, we affirm the trial court‘s summary denial of relief on this claim."  Hutchinson v. State, 17 So.3d 696 (Fla. 2009).

Trial court properly denied motion to disqualify moving party's former lawyer based on conflict rule that applies to current clients.  [Added 7/13/09]

    Movant filed a motion seeking disqualification of the opposing party's lawyer "based on prior cases in which [Lawyer] had represented" Movant.  The trial court initially granted the motion, then later vacated the order.  Movant petitioned the Third DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The Third DCA denied the petition.  Movant's motion sought disqualification of Lawyer based solely on Rule 4-1.7 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar.  The court stated:  "The record before us is devoid of any evidence that [Movant] was an existing client of [Lawyer] at the time of the instant litigation.  On its face, rule 4-1.7 is titled as applying only to 'Current Clients.'  Indeed, no court has applied rule 4-1.7 to cases involving any individual or entity that is not a current client.  See, e.g., Fenik v. One Water Place, Case No. 3:06cv514/RV/EMT, 2007 WL 527997, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2007) (describing rule 4-1.7 as governing disqualification for conflicts of interest with a current client as opposed to rule 4-1.9, which governs disqualification for conflicts of interests with a former client); In re Servico, Inc., 149 B.R. 1009, 1011 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).  Given that [Movant] has not shown that he is a current client of [Lawyer], it cannot be said that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in finding no conflict under rule 4-1.7."  (Emphasis by court.)  Schulte v. Angus, 14 So.3d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Third DCA reverses circuit order permitting Public Defender's Office to decline representation in all future 3rd-degree felony cases.  [Added 5/15/09]  --  State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So.3d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Law firm's effort to withdraw from case in response to motion to disqualify may not remedy problem.  [Added 4/2/09]  --  Lewis v. Nical of Palm Beach, Inc., 10 So.3d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Regional Conflict Counsel has no standing to object to Public Defender's motion to withdraw from case on conflict grounds.  [Added 3/20/09]  --  Johnson v. State, 6 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), 2009 WL 690989.

Third DCA reminds lawyers of high standards that apply when lawyers engage in business dealings with clients.  [Added 3/4/09]  --  Brigham v. Brigham, 11 So.3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Florida Supreme Court imposes 18-month suspension on lawyer who started business that competed with one of his clients.  [Added 2/24/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Herman, 8 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 2009).

ABA House of Delegates amends Model Rule of Professional Conduct to allow law firms to screen lateral hires in order to prevent disqualification.  [Added 2/17/09]

Trial court erred in disqualifying entire State Attorney's Office from prosecuting criminal case.  [Added 12/8/08]  --  State v. Hayes, 997 So.2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Once case sent to arbitrators per agreement to arbitrate, issue of lawyer disqualification is for arbitrators rather than trial court.  [Added 11/15/08]  --  Reuter Recycling of Florida, Inc. v. City of Hallendale, 993 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in appointing lawyer to represent criminal defendant when lawyer had previously represented client and co-defendant.  [Added 10/24/08]  --  Cadejuste v. State, 993 So.2d 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in granting motion to disqualify counsel filed 2 years after underlying facts became known.  [Added 10/17/08]  --  Rahman v. Jackson, 992 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in denying public defender's motion to withdraw based on his office's simultaneous representation of defendant and informant who was helping prosecution.  [Added 9/28/08]  --  Scott v. State, 991 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Disqualification based on inadvertent receipt of privileged documents extends to entire law firm, not just receiving lawyer.  [Added 9/23/08]  --  Atlas Air, Inc. v. Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 997 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Fourth DCA quashes order disqualifying lawyer from opposing former client; matters not "substantially related."  [Added 7/15/08]  --  Waldrep v. Waldrep, 985 So.2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Order disqualifying law firm is quashed because trial court ruled without holding evidentiary hearing.  [Added 7/10/08]  --  The Event Firm, LLC v. Augustin, 985 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Alleged "agency" relationship does not disqualify lawyer who was referred case due to referring lawyer's conflict of interest, nor does privileged information inadvertently included in transferred file require disqualification.  [Added 5/29/08]  --  Manning v. Cooper, 981 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Finding additional conflict of interest violation, Florida Supreme Court rejects recommended discipline and suspends lawyer.  [Added 1/24/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Brown, 978 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2008).

Florida Supreme Court discusses conflicts of interest and imputation of conflicts in context of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  [Added 11/19/07]  --  Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852 (Fla. 2007) (revised opinion).

Questioned fee arrangement does not result in reversal of conviction, but defense counsel's handling of murder weapon does.  [Added 11/14/07]  --  Alessi v. State, 969 So.2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Defense counsel's "nodding acquaintance" with key state witness was not conflict of interest requiring counsel's withdrawal; counsel's failure to move for judge's disqualification not ineffective assistance.  [Added 10/17/07]  --    Kormondy v. State, 983 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2007).

Meaning of "substantially related matter" in context of disqualification motion filed by lawyer's former client discussed by Fourth DCA.  [Added 7/26/07]  --  Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, Inc. v. Bradley, 961 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Per Florida Supreme Court, Rule 4-3.7 (lawyer as witness) does not require withdrawal of lawyer who will testify in client's favor at post-trial hearing.  [Added 7/5/07]  --  Willacy v. State, 967 So.2d 131 (Fla. 2007).

Trial court erred in relying on unsworn argument as only factual basis for disqualifying moving lawyer and his new firm; Second DCA notes that governing standard is Rule 4-1.10(b).  [Added 6/16/07]  --  Bon-Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Center, Inc. v. Seaman, 959 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Florida Commission on Ethics advises that conflict of interest under Florida ethics laws exists when member of city commissioner's law firm represents clients before commission, but not before other city boards.  [Added 6/7/07]  --  Florida Commission on Ethics Opinion 07-13.

Judge in domestic matter did not err by appointing one party's lawyer as special prosecutor to pursue indirect criminal contempt charge against other party.  [Added 5/24/07]  --  Gordon v. State, 960 So.2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).  See also Gordon v. State, 967 So.2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (opinion denying rehearing).

Error to disqualify entire state attorney's office on ground that one of its prosecutors might be called as impeachment witness by defendant.  [Added 4/25/07]  --  State v. Fields, 954 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Lawyer who formerly represented client but moved to new law firm remains subject to irrefutable presumption that confidences were acquired; Rule 4-1.9 (rather than Rule 4-1.10) governs disqualification issue.  [Added 12/20/06]  --  Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, Inc. v. Bradley, 944 So.2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (on rehearing).

In parental notification of abortion case, judge erred in disqualifying minor's lawyer who also worked as assistant public defender. [Added 12/18/06]  --  In re: Jane Doe 06-C, 948 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

No rule of automatic disqualification when lawyer received privileged documents through inadvertent disclosure.  [Added 9/27/06]  --  Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. v. Vasa, 941 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Alleged prejudice to party that plans to call opponent's lawyer as witness is not basis for disqualification under Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.7.  [Added 8/10/06]  --  AlliedSignal Recovery Trust v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Lawyer who continues to represent multiple clients after conflict arises not entitled to fees for work performed after that point.  [Added 7/8/06]  --  James T. Butler, P.A. v. Walker, 932 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Criminal defendant's filing of federal suit against his lawyer is not conflict that requires appointment of new counsel.  [Added 3/7/06]  --  Miller v. State, 921 So.2d 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Lawyer disqualified from opposing former client in substantially related matter, despite lawyer's lack of "inside information."  [Added 3/3/06]  --  Estright v. Bay Point Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 921 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Lawyer-witness rule disqualifies lawyer who drew will from representing party in will contest; Rule 4-3.7 upheld against constitutional attack.  [Added 1/31/06]  --  Eccles v. Nelson, 919 So.2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Focusing on factual differences and absence of informational advantage, court concludes matters not "substantially related" and declines to disqualify lawyer who opposes former client.  [Added 12/23/05]  --  Frank, Weinberg & Black, P.A. v. Effman, 916 So.2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

When lawyer moves to new firm that opposes old firm's client, no irrefutable presumption of confidences requiring new firm's disqualification.  [Added 10/11/05]  --  Solomon v. Dickison, 916 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

In litigation between 2 corporate shareholders, lawyer disqualified from representing both shareholder and corporation, but could represent shareholder alone.  [Added 9/21/05]  --   Campellone v. Cragan, 910 So.2d 363 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Second DCA suggests need for legislative regulation in Florida of advance funding industry.  [Added 9/16/05]  --  Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc.,  915 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Corporation's law firm owed duties to entity rather than individual shareholders; additionally, individuals waived all conflicts.  [Added 2/7/05]  --  Rudolf v. Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., 901 So.2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Absent showing that current representation was adverse to lawyer's former client, lawyer's disqualification not appropriate.  [Added 1/27/05]  --  Herschowsky v. Guardianship of Herschowsky, 890 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Firm representing "Client A" in suit against "Client B" violates Rule 4-1.7 and is disqualified, even where firm's representation of "Client B" is unrelated to suit.  [Added 1/2/05]  --  Harvey E. Morse, P.A. v. Clark, 890 So.2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Disqualification "premature" where, at time of disqualification order, record did not show lawyer would be necessary witness.  [Added 12/31/04]  --  Brooks v. Foster, 889 So.2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Plaintiff lacked standing to move for disqualification of opposing counsel who never represented her.  [Added 10/19/04]  --  Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 884 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004).

Rule 4-1.7 does not prohibit law firm from concurrently representing plaintiff in shareholder derivative suit and in individual action against corporation.  [Added 8/3/04]  --  Gonzalez v. Chillura, 892 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (on rehearing).

Trial court erred in disqualifying law firm that briefly hired, as part-time independent contractor, former legal secretary of opposing law firm who had been privy to confidential information.  [Added 3/24/04]  --  Eastrich No. 157 Corp. v. Gatto, 868 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2004).

F.S. 57.105 can present "inherent conflict" between lawyer and client.  [Added 7/28/03]  --    Kerzner v. Lerman, 849 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2003).  (The Fifth DCA recently noted a potential ethical conflict in the application of Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105.  See Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2003).)