Per Fla. Supreme Court, public defender's certification of conflict does not automatically shift representation to RCC, but RCC has no standing to object to P.D.'s motion to withdraw.  [Added 1/14/12]

    The Florida Supreme Court approved in part and quashed in part the Fourth DCA's decision in Johnson v. State, 6 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) and disapproved the Third DCA's decision in State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So.3d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), review granted 34 So.3d 2 (Fla. 2010).  The Court concluded:  (1) that a public defender's certification of conflict does not by itself shift the representation to the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel ("RCC"); and (2) that the RCC has no standing to object to the public defender's conflict-based motion to withdraw.

    Effect of certification of conflict.  In Johnson the Fourth DCA decided that, under the plain language of Fla.Stat. sec. 27.511(8) (2008), in appellate matters a public defender's certification of conflict alone was sufficient to shift the conflict representation to the RCC.  In other words, the appellate court was not authorized to inquire into the matter but must rely on the public defender's certification.  The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, concluding that the Fourth DCA's position was not consistent with legislative history or intent.  "We reject the public defender's argument that this statute [Fla.Stat. sec. 27.5303(1)(a) (2008)] cannot apply to appellate courts because appellate courts do not conduct hearings as the second sentence of the statute provides.  In fact, appellate courts do review motions for their adequacy and can direct further inquiry on motions through orders to show cause or by scheduling oral argument.  Moreover, when section 27.511(8) and section 27.5303(1)(a) are read in pari materia, there is no contradiction in the statutes and one can discern a reconciled legislative intent that courts review all motions to withdraw, at both the trial and appellate level, and make further inquiry if necessary.  . . .  [W]e hold that section 27.5303(1)(a) governs all public defender motions to withdraw based on conflict, both at the trial and appellate level, and the court where the motion is filed is required to review such motions for sufficiency."

    Standing to object to conflict-based motion to withdraw.  The Court also ruled that the RCC has no standing to object to a public defender's good faith motion to withdraw based on asserted conflict.  "Because RCC is not a party, it is not in the best position to address the determination of conflict."  Johnson v. State of Florida, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC09-1045, 1/5/2012).

Professional Ethics Committee adopts proposed advisory opinion regarding representation of Department of Revenue in child support cases.  [Added 9/30/11]

    At its meeting in Orlando on September 21, the Florida Bar Professional Ethics Committee voted to take action on several items of interest to Florida lawyers including the following.

    The Committee voted to publish for comment Proposed Advisory Opinion ("PAO") 11-1.  PAO 11-1 was adopted in response to an inquiry from the Eleventh Judicial Circuit State Attorney's Office.  By state law state Florida Department of Revenue ("DOR")  is responsible for administering the Title IV-D child-12 support program in Florida.  The state attorney's office represents DOR.  The law requires DOR to review child support obligations to determine whether the amounts remain consistent with current support guidelines and to seek adjustments when appropriate.  In carrying out its duties, DOR may find itself seeking to enforce a child support obligation against a non-custodial parent and later seeking a reduction of the same support order on that non-custodial parent’s behalf.  Fla.Stat. sec. 409.2564(5) provides that "[a]n attorney-client relationship exists only between the department and the legal services providers in all Title IV-D cases."

    Former Florida Ethics Opinion 92-2 had concluded that, despite section 409.2564(5), "it would be unethical for an attorney who has received confidential information from one parent to later act adversely to that parent in a matter involving that confidential information "  In response to the inquiry from the State Attorney's Office, the Professional Committee withdrew Opinion 92-2 at its June 2011 meeting.  PAO 11-1 was adopted to replace the withdrawn opinion.  PAO 11-1 referenced Department of Revenue v. Collingwood, 43 So.3d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), and concludes:  "Because the parent as a matter of law is not a client of the lawyer representing DOR, that lawyer owes the parent none of the ethical obligations that are premised on the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, including the obligations of loyalty and confidentiality.  Accordingly, there are no ethical limitations on the lawyer’s representing DOR in its (DOR’s) providing services to a parent, regardless of a prior representation in which the services were provided to the other parent."  In PAO 11-1 the Committee acknowledged the existence of Fla.Stat. sec. 90.502(5) but stated that "[a]lthough the Committee believes that this provision does not in itself create a lawyer-client relationship between the lawyer and the recipient of DOR’s services, its impact is a legal question beyond the scope of an ethics opinion."

    PAO 11-1 will be published in the Florida Bar News along with a notice inviting any interested Bar members to file comments for consideration by the Committee at its next meeting.  See Rule 4(d), Florida Bar Procedures for Ruling on Questions of Ethics.

    Watch sunEthics.com for updates.

Law firm disqualified from representing bank against guarantor due to unfair informational advantage gained by simultaneously representing  guarantor's former lawyer in related malpractice suit.  [Added 9/28/11]

    Bank sued a limited liability company to foreclose on a note and mortgage.  Bank also sued Frye, who had give a personal guaranty of the note.  Frye hired attorney Trupp and his law firm (the "Arnstein firm") to defend him against Bank's claims.  Frye later discharged Trupp and the Arnstein firm and sued them alleging legal malpractice "based upon their representation of him in the Bank's action as well as in other matters involving loans and personal guaranties.  Significantly, [Frye] alleged in his malpractice complaint that [Trupp] and [the Arnstein firm] firm obtained 'confidences of [Frye] during their representation, including, without limitation, information gleaned from performing estate and asset planning for [Frye] giving [Trupp and the Arnstein firm] intimate knowledge of [Frye's] financial circumstances.'"

    Shortly after the malpractice suit was filed Bank replaced its current counsel with the Henderson Franklin law firm.  Trupp and the Arnstein firm also retained Henderson Franklin to represent them in Frye's malpractice action against them.  Thus, Henderson Franklin was simultaneously representing Bank against Frye and Frye's former counsel against Frye.

    Frye filed a motion to disqualify Henderson Franklin as counsel for Bank in the guaranty action.  Frye alleged that Henderson Franklin had an unfair informational advantage in that matter because, due to its attorney-client representation with his former counsel, Henderson Franklin had access  to files and confidential information that Trupp and the Arnstein firm had as a result of representing Frye in the case involving the Bank.  The trial court denied the disqualification motion on the ground that there had been no attorney-client relationship between Frye and Henderson Franklin.  Seeking to quash the order, Frye petitioned for a writ of certiorai.

    The Second DCA granted the petition.  The court summarized:  "[T]he question presented is whether Henderson Franklin's access to confidential communications between Mr. Frye and his former lawyer through its representation of the lawyer in the legal malpractice action is sufficient to require the disqualification of Henderson Franklin from continued representation of the Bank in the action against Mr. Frye on the guaranty.  We conclude that the unfair informational advantage accruing to Henderson Franklin through its representation of Mr. Frye in the legal malpractice action disqualifies it from further representation of the Bank in its action against Mr. Frye on the guaranty."  The court found support for its decision in Adelman v. Adelman, 561 So.2d 671 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

    Frye's former lawyer, Trupp, "is irrefutably presumed to have obtained confidential information from his former client" in the context of  representing Frye in the Bank's action on the guaranty and in estate and asset planning matters.  Trupp was ethically permitted to disclose confidential information to defend himself in the malpractice action brought by Fyre.  See Rule 4-1.6, Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.  Thus, Trupp could disclose such information to his counsel, Henderson Franklin.  As a result, Henderson Franklin would possess confidential information that it could use against Frye in the Bank's guaranty action.  "It follows that Henderson Franklin must be disqualified from representing the Bank in its action against Mr. Frye because of the unfair informational advantage Henderson Franklin has gained by virtue of its representation of Mr. Trupp and the Arnstein firm in the defense of Mr. Frye's malpractice action.  See Adelman, 561 So.2d at 673; see also Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So.3d 134, 137 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (noting that 'disqualification is appropriate where a party obtains an unfair informational or tactical advantage through the disclosure of privileged information to that party's counsel'); Greig v. Macy's Ne., Inc., 1 F.Supp. 2d 397 (D.N.J. 1998) (requiring disqualification of counsel under facts similar to those in Adelman and in this case)."

    Because Frye sought disqualification based on the unfair information advantage and not a conflict of interest theory, he did not have to show that he had an attorney-client relationship with Henderson Franklin.  Frye v. Ironstone Bank, 69 So.3d 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Court should not have disqualified lawyer despite unusual conflict of interest on the part of person who hired him.  [Added 8/16/11]

    Razin and Bahl were managing members of A Milestone, LLC ("Milestone").  They had a falling out.  Razin sued Milestone to collect monies allegedly due him.  Razin hired attorney Norman to represent Milestone in the collection action.  Bahl, however, hired attorney McDermott to represent Milestone.  Each attorney moved to disqualify the other.  The trial court disqualified both attorneys and appointed a custodian to represent Milestone.

    On appeal, the Second DCA reversed the order disqualifying Norman and affirmed the order disqualifying McDermott.  The court noted that Milestone's operating agreement "clearly indicates that as long as the Razin loan remains outstanding, Razin had controlling authority over any decision affecting Milestone in the event of a disagreement.  . . .  Because there is no dispute that Razin is a manager and that the loan is outstanding, we believe that the parties to the operating agreement – Razin and Bahl – remain bound by it."  Unlike the trial court, the appeals court did not base its decision on the alleged conflict of interest under which Razin was operating.  "[T]he trial court noted that it was troubled by what appeared to be Razin's conflict of interest in retaining counsel to represent Milestone in defense of Razin's collection action.  But even though this scenario does not appear to be an arm's length transaction, the fact remains that Bahl agreed to the inclusion of article VII, section 1 [of the operating agreement], in return for Razin's $1,000,000 loan.  Parties are free to waive any potential conflicts of interest, see Rudolf v. Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., 901 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (noting that shareholders of corporation had expressly waived any conflicts of interest from law firm representing corporation and individual shareholders), and we are powerless to rewrite the agreement in order to make it more reasonable for Bahl."

    The appellate court also concluded that "there is nothing in our record to suggest that Norman was representing Milestone in name only and instead actually working to protect Razin's interests."  In a footnote, the court referred to the applicable attorney-client relationship principles:  "In fact, because Norman was hired to represent Milestone, he had no duty to either Razin or Bahl individually; Norman's duty ran only to Milestone.  See Rudolf, 901 So. 2d at 150, 150 n.4 (discussing comments to Florida Rule of Professional Conduct 4-1.13 which provide that when a lawyer represents an organization, the entity is the client, not the constituents of the organization)."  Razin v. A Milestone, LLC, 67 So.3d 391 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Supreme Court suspends lawyer for 3 years for rule violations in representation of putative class.  [Added 5/4/11]  --  Florida Bar v. Adorno, 60 So.3d 1016 (Fla. 2011).

Florida Supreme Court suspends lawyer whose sexual relationships with clients violated conflict rule and other rules.  [Added 3/7/11]  --  Florida Bar v. Roberto, 59 So.3d 1101 (Fla. 2011).

Party moving for disqualification had no standing to do so where party had no relationship with subject law firm.  [Added 3/4/11]  --  Continental Casualty Co. v. Przewoznik, 55 So.3d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

Conviction reversed because the trial court did not hold Nelson hearing, even though defendant never moved to discharge counsel.  [Added 1/18/11]  --  Penn v. State, 51 So.3d 622 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Lawyer's agreement not to represent anyone against the law firm that formerly employed him does not violate public policy.  [Added 1/3/11]  --   Alan B. Garfinkel, P.A. v. Mager, 57 So.3d 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Court's failure to inquire into defense counsel's potential conflict is not subject to harmless error rule.  [Added 9/14/10]  --  Hannah v. State, 42 So.3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA, No. 4D09-1039, 9/1/2010).

Court departed from essential requirements of law in granting motion to disqualify law firm.  [Added 7/28/10]  --  Zayas-Bazan v. Marcelin, 40 So.3d 870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Court erred by ordering lawyer's disqualification after appeal had been filed.  [Added 7/24/10]  --  Kluck v. Cloninger, 39 So.3d 1277 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

First DCA clarifies that Department of Revenue lawyers represent Department, not parent, in child support actions.  [Added 7/19/10]  --  Florida Dept. of Revenue v. Collingwood, 43 So.3d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Court erred in granting Public Defender's motion to withdraw based on alleged "excessive caseload" conflict.  [Added 7/8/10]  --  State v. Bowens, 39 So.3d 479 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

In conflict of interest case, Florida Supreme Court imposes harsher disciplinary sanction than that recommended by referee.  [Added 6/10/10]  --  Florida Bar v. Scott, 39 So.3d 309 (Fla. 2010).

Law firm that outsourced trial preparation work that client paid for had "palpable" lawyer-client conflict and could be subject to client's excessive fee claim under Rule 4-1.5.  [Added 5/25/10]  --  Liebreich v. Trial Strategies, Inc., 40 So.3d 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

Lawyers and client sanctioned for appealing non-appealable order, and court notes that client may have conflict-free counsel when sanction amount is determined on remand.  [Added 5/19/10]  --  Maradriaga v. 7-Eleven, 35 So.3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Fifth DCA concurring opinion points out potential conflict when lawyer represents client in arguing for reversal of 57.105 sanctions order against both.  [Added 3/29/10]  --  Geiger v. Spurlock, 30 So.3d 704 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Law firm's representation of LLC did not create attorney-client relationship with principal for purposes of disqualification.  [Added 3/11/10]  --  PMG Collins, LLC v. R and G Enterprises, LLC, 30 So.3d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Court properly declined to disqualify former prosecutor from representing defendant, where lawyer had not substantially participated in defendant's prosecution.  [Added 3/2/10]  --    State v. de la Osa, 28 So.3d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). 

    NOTE:  Although not mentioned in the court's opinion, the result appears to be consistent with Rule 4-1.11(a), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides:  "A lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:  (1) is subject to rule 4-1.9(b); and (2) shall not otherwise represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation."

Law firm disqualified based on unfair informational or tactical advantage obtained through receipt of opposing party's privileged materials.  [Added 2/12/10]  --  Castellano v. Winthrop, 27 So.3d 134 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Disqualification of party's law firm was premature where party not allowed to present evidence refuting movant's claims.  [Added 2/10/10]  --  Minakan v. Husted, 27 So.3d 695 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Conflict rule governing concurrent representation of clients (RPC 4-1.7) does not permit analysis of whether conflict is "material."  [Added 1/14/10]  --  Lincoln Associates & Construction, Inc. v. Wentworth Construction Co., Inc., 26 So.3d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Trial court erred in disqualifying lawyer who would be called as witness by opposing party without determining whether lawyer's testimony would be adverse to her client.  [Added 11/15/09]  --  Alto Construction Co. v. Flagler Construction Equipment, LLC, 22 So.3d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court properly denied motion to disqualify law firm based on alleged conflict of interest and breach of fiduciary duty grounds.  [Added 11/5/09]  --  Kaplan v. Divosta Homes, L.P., 20 So.3d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to compel deposition of plaintiff's counsel.  [Added 9/14/09]  --  Nucci v. Simmons, 20 So.3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Postconviction court should have appointed counsel after defendant claimed conflict with his lawyer, who had since left public defender's office.  [Added 8/14/09]  --  Howard v. State, 17 So.3d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify entire State Attorney's Office after it hired lawyer who had been representing defendant on his criminal case.  [Added 7/25/09]  --  Lot v. State, 13 So.3d 1121 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Neither trial counsel's personal dislike of client nor client's filing of Bar complaint resulted in ineffective assistance.  [Added 7/15/09]  --  Hutchinson v. State, 17 So.3d 696 (Fla. 2009).

Trial court properly denied motion to disqualify moving party's former lawyer based on conflict rule that applies to current clients.  [Added 7/13/09]  --  Schulte v. Angus, 14 So.3d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Third DCA reverses circuit order permitting Public Defender's Office to decline representation in all future 3rd-degree felony cases.  [Added 5/15/09]  --  State v. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 12 So.3d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Law firm's effort to withdraw from case in response to motion to disqualify may not remedy problem.  [Added 4/2/09]  --  Lewis v. Nical of Palm Beach, Inc., 10 So.3d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Regional Conflict Counsel has no standing to object to Public Defender's motion to withdraw from case on conflict grounds.  [Added 3/20/09]  --  Johnson v. State, 6 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), 2009 WL 690989.

Third DCA reminds lawyers of high standards that apply when lawyers engage in business dealings with clients.  [Added 3/4/09]  --  Brigham v. Brigham, 11 So.3d 374 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Florida Supreme Court imposes 18-month suspension on lawyer who started business that competed with one of his clients.  [Added 2/24/09]  --  Florida Bar v. Herman, 8 So.3d 1100 (Fla. 2009).

ABA House of Delegates amends Model Rule of Professional Conduct to allow law firms to screen lateral hires in order to prevent disqualification.  [Added 2/17/09]

Trial court erred in disqualifying entire State Attorney's Office from prosecuting criminal case.  [Added 12/8/08]  --  State v. Hayes, 997 So.2d 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Once case sent to arbitrators per agreement to arbitrate, issue of lawyer disqualification is for arbitrators rather than trial court.  [Added 11/15/08]  --  Reuter Recycling of Florida, Inc. v. City of Hallendale, 993 So.2d 1178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in appointing lawyer to represent criminal defendant when lawyer had previously represented client and co-defendant.  [Added 10/24/08]  --  Cadejuste v. State, 993 So.2d 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in granting motion to disqualify counsel filed 2 years after underlying facts became known.  [Added 10/17/08]  --  Rahman v. Jackson, 992 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Trial court erred in denying public defender's motion to withdraw based on his office's simultaneous representation of defendant and informant who was helping prosecution.  [Added 9/28/08]  --  Scott v. State, 991 So.2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Disqualification based on inadvertent receipt of privileged documents extends to entire law firm, not just receiving lawyer.  [Added 9/23/08]  --  Atlas Air, Inc. v. Greenberg Traurig, P.A., 997 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Fourth DCA quashes order disqualifying lawyer from opposing former client; matters not "substantially related."  [Added 7/15/08]  --  Waldrep v. Waldrep, 985 So.2d 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Order disqualifying law firm is quashed because trial court ruled without holding evidentiary hearing.  [Added 7/10/08]  --  The Event Firm, LLC v. Augustin, 985 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Alleged "agency" relationship does not disqualify lawyer who was referred case due to referring lawyer's conflict of interest, nor does privileged information inadvertently included in transferred file require disqualification.  [Added 5/29/08]  --  Manning v. Cooper, 981 So.2d 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Finding additional conflict of interest violation, Florida Supreme Court rejects recommended discipline and suspends lawyer.  [Added 1/24/08]  --  Florida Bar v. Brown, 978 So.2d 107 (Fla. 2008).

Florida Supreme Court discusses conflicts of interest and imputation of conflicts in context of ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  [Added 11/19/07]  --  Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852 (Fla. 2007) (revised opinion).

Questioned fee arrangement does not result in reversal of conviction, but defense counsel's handling of murder weapon does.  [Added 11/14/07]  --  Alessi v. State, 969 So.2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Defense counsel's "nodding acquaintance" with key state witness was not conflict of interest requiring counsel's withdrawal; counsel's failure to move for judge's disqualification not ineffective assistance.  [Added 10/17/07]  --    Kormondy v. State, 983 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2007).

Meaning of "substantially related matter" in context of disqualification motion filed by lawyer's former client discussed by Fourth DCA.  [Added 7/26/07]  --  Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, Inc. v. Bradley, 961 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Per Florida Supreme Court, Rule 4-3.7 (lawyer as witness) does not require withdrawal of lawyer who will testify in client's favor at post-trial hearing.  [Added 7/5/07]  --  Willacy v. State, 967 So.2d 131 (Fla. 2007).

Trial court erred in relying on unsworn argument as only factual basis for disqualifying moving lawyer and his new firm; Second DCA notes that governing standard is Rule 4-1.10(b).  [Added 6/16/07]  --  Bon-Secours-Maria Manor Nursing Care Center, Inc. v. Seaman, 959 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Florida Commission on Ethics advises that conflict of interest under Florida ethics laws exists when member of city commissioner's law firm represents clients before commission, but not before other city boards.  [Added 6/7/07]  --  Florida Commission on Ethics Opinion 07-13.

Judge in domestic matter did not err by appointing one party's lawyer as special prosecutor to pursue indirect criminal contempt charge against other party.  [Added 5/24/07]  --  Gordon v. State, 960 So.2d 31 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).  See also Gordon v. State, 967 So.2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (opinion denying rehearing).

Error to disqualify entire state attorney's office on ground that one of its prosecutors might be called as impeachment witness by defendant.  [Added 4/25/07]  --  State v. Fields, 954 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Lawyer who formerly represented client but moved to new law firm remains subject to irrefutable presumption that confidences were acquired; Rule 4-1.9 (rather than Rule 4-1.10) governs disqualification issue.  [Added 12/20/06]  --  Health Care and Retirement Corp. of America, Inc. v. Bradley, 944 So.2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (on rehearing).

In parental notification of abortion case, judge erred in disqualifying minor's lawyer who also worked as assistant public defender. [Added 12/18/06]  --  In re: Jane Doe 06-C, 948 So.2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

No rule of automatic disqualification when lawyer received privileged documents through inadvertent disclosure.  [Added 9/27/06]  --  Applied Digital Solutions, Inc. v. Vasa, 941 So.2d 404 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Alleged prejudice to party that plans to call opponent's lawyer as witness is not basis for disqualification under Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.7.  [Added 8/10/06]  --  AlliedSignal Recovery Trust v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 934 So.2d 675 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Lawyer who continues to represent multiple clients after conflict arises not entitled to fees for work performed after that point.  [Added 7/8/06]  --  James T. Butler, P.A. v. Walker, 932 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Criminal defendant's filing of federal suit against his lawyer is not conflict that requires appointment of new counsel.  [Added 3/7/06]  --  Miller v. State, 921 So.2d 816 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Lawyer disqualified from opposing former client in substantially related matter, despite lawyer's lack of "inside information."  [Added 3/3/06]  --  Estright v. Bay Point Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 921 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Lawyer-witness rule disqualifies lawyer who drew will from representing party in will contest; Rule 4-3.7 upheld against constitutional attack.  [Added 1/31/06]  --  Eccles v. Nelson, 919 So.2d 658 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Focusing on factual differences and absence of informational advantage, court concludes matters not "substantially related" and declines to disqualify lawyer who opposes former client.  [Added 12/23/05]  --  Frank, Weinberg & Black, P.A. v. Effman, 916 So.2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

When lawyer moves to new firm that opposes old firm's client, no irrefutable presumption of confidences requiring new firm's disqualification.  [Added 10/11/05]  --  Solomon v. Dickison, 916 So.2d 943 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

In litigation between 2 corporate shareholders, lawyer disqualified from representing both shareholder and corporation, but could represent shareholder alone.  [Added 9/21/05]  --   Campellone v. Cragan, 910 So.2d 363 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Second DCA suggests need for legislative regulation in Florida of advance funding industry.  [Added 9/16/05]  --  Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc.,  915 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).

Corporation's law firm owed duties to entity rather than individual shareholders; additionally, individuals waived all conflicts.  [Added 2/7/05]  --  Rudolf v. Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., 901 So.2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Absent showing that current representation was adverse to lawyer's former client, lawyer's disqualification not appropriate.  [Added 1/27/05]  --  Herschowsky v. Guardianship of Herschowsky, 890 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Firm representing "Client A" in suit against "Client B" violates Rule 4-1.7 and is disqualified, even where firm's representation of "Client B" is unrelated to suit.  [Added 1/2/05]  --  Harvey E. Morse, P.A. v. Clark, 890 So.2d 496 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Disqualification "premature" where, at time of disqualification order, record did not show lawyer would be necessary witness.  [Added 12/31/04]  --  Brooks v. Foster, 889 So.2d 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004).

Plaintiff lacked standing to move for disqualification of opposing counsel who never represented her.  [Added 10/19/04]  --  Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Gibson, 884 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004).

Rule 4-1.7 does not prohibit law firm from concurrently representing plaintiff in shareholder derivative suit and in individual action against corporation.  [Added 8/3/04]  --  Gonzalez v. Chillura, 892 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (on rehearing).

Trial court erred in disqualifying law firm that briefly hired, as part-time independent contractor, former legal secretary of opposing law firm who had been privy to confidential information.  [Added 3/24/04]  --  Eastrich No. 157 Corp. v. Gatto, 868 So.2d 1266 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2004).

F.S. 57.105 can present "inherent conflict" between lawyer and client.  [Added 7/28/03]  --    Kerzner v. Lerman, 849 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 4^th DCA 2003).  (The Fifth DCA recently noted a potential ethical conflict in the application of Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105.  See Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So.2d 1151 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2003).)