Conduct resulting in finding of no probable cause can be used as aggravating factor in disciplinary case, per Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 6/30/10]

    Lawyer was accused of ethical violations arising from the taking of a deposition.  A grievance committee found no probable cause with respect to all aspects of the conduct except for Lawyer's acts involving a laptop computer.  The Florida Bar filed a formal complaint against Lawyer regarding the laptop incident.  Lawyer was found guilty, and the referee recommended alternative sanctions of either disbarment or  2-year suspension with conditions.  Lawyer sought Florida Supreme Court review.

    The Supreme Court disapproved the recommendations as to sanctions "as not reasonably based on existing caselaw or standards [Florida Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions]."  Instead, the Court suspended Lawyer for 60 days and ordered that he be publicly reprimanded.

    In a footnote the Court agreed with the referee that Lawyer's conduct provided a "glaring example" of unprofessional conduct that should be shown to lawyers and law students for instructional purposes:  "The referee has suggested and we agree that members of the Bar and law students could view the video recording of the laptop incident in the context of a course on professionalism as a glaring example of how not to conduct oneself in a legal proceeding."  Florida Bar v. Ratiner, __ So.3d ___ (Fla., No. SC08-689, 6/24/2010), 2010 WL 2517995.

First DCA cautions criminal defense lawyer against repeatedly raising "non-meritorious" arguments court has rejected before.  [Added 6/23/10]

    Lawyer represented a convicted criminal defendant in an appeal.  The First DCA affirmed, rejecting the arguments presented by Lawyer.

    The court then issued a warning to Lawyer:  "Counsel for Appellant has raised these same arguments in numerous cases before this court, including Harris [v. State, 932 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)].  We affirmed all of these cases.  It is one thing for counsel to zealously advocate a colorable legal claim on behalf of a client; it is quite another for counsel to continue to raise the same non-meritorious arguments in the face of adverse rulings, which is what counsel for Appellant is doing at this point.  Accordingly, counsel for Appellant is cautioned against continuing to raise these same arguments absent a favorable ruling from a higher court or a change in the law."  (Footnotes omitted.  In a footnote, the court pointed out that Lawyer has made "essentially the same arguments" in Harris and that the court has clearly rejected them.)  Williams v. State, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly D1213 (Fla. 1st DCA, No. 1D09-3707, 5/28/2010), 2010 WL 2134093.

Concurring opinion from Fifth DCA criticizes prosecutor's actions and attitude in connection with improper closing argument.  [Added 6/23/10]

    The Fifth DCA issued a per curiam affirmance of a criminal conviction, apparently on a harmless error basis.  One judge wrote a concurring opinion criticizing the prosecutor's conduct.  The judge observed that the prosecutor's error in making a closing argument that attempted to shift the burden of proof "was so basic it was elementary" and stated that "[a] modicum of research would have revealed a plethora of case law disapproving of the prosecutor's comment."  (Footnotes omitted.)

    The judge continued:  "What is also disconcerting was the prosecutor's cavalier attitude toward what constituted a potentially serious error.  In response to the trial judge's concerns, the prosecutor responded, 'Then grant the motion [for mistrial], Your Honor, because that's what it sounds like you are doing.  I'm not going to waste another four hours on this case, it sounds like that's where you are leading.'  Many a trial judge would have accepted the prosecutor's invitation."  Lumpkin v. State, __ So.3d ___, 35 Fla.L.Weekly D1267 (Fla. 5th DCA, No. 5D09-1501, 6/4/2010), 2010 WL 2218484.

Third DCA criticizes law firm's actions but rules that firm is protected by litigation immunity.  [Added 3/22/10]

    Law Firm represented two condominium associations that were opposed to unit purchases by a person who allegedly was trying to acquire control by owning a majority of the condo units.  Law Firm recorded a lis pendens and filed suit to enjoin a proposed sale.  One of the defendants sued Law Firm alleging tortious interference with the proposed sale.  Law Firm "defended on the doctrine that the actions taken by the firm were privileged because the firm was only acting at the client’s request.  . . .  [Law Firm] admitted that the lis pendens was filed to prevent the transfer of the subject unit.  [Law Firm] moved for summary judgment, claiming that the firm had a justifiable privilege to act as it did, as a matter of law."

    The trial court "concluded that because the lis pendens was part of a lawsuit, there was qualified immunity where no malice shown on the firm’s part" and then "entered summary judgment for the firm finding that it was acting on the client’s instruction and no malice was shown."

    The Third DCA affirmed, citing, inter alia, Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2007).  The lis pendens was filed during the course of a judicial proceeding and at the direction of Law Firm's client.  Thus, its filing was privileged and could not be the basis of an action for tortious interference.

    The appellate court, however, criticized the conduct of Law Firm.  The court opened its opinion by stating that it did not agree with the actions taken by Law Firm, and closed by stating:  "Although we think that the behavior of the [] law firm may have been highly unethical, we must affirm."  Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, LLP, 30 So.3d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

First DCA imposes 57.105 fees against party and his lawyer who sought certiorari review after unsworn motion to disqualify JCC was denied.  [Added 3/5/10]

    Represented by Lawyer, Claimant filed a motion to disqualify the Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC") in a workers' compensation case.  The motion was not sworn to, as required by Fla.Admin.Code R. 60Q-6.126 and Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.330(c)(3).  The motion was denied.  Claimant then petitioned the First DCA for a writ of prohibition.

    The appellate court denied the petition and also imposed appellate attorney's fees against Claimant and his attorney under F.S. 57.105(1)(b) (2008).  After Claimant's untimely filing of a reply brief, the court issued an order to show cause why fees should not be imposed "because it appeared that the petition and briefs reflected a lack of knowledge of the rules of appellate procedure and case law, and failed to provide relevant information for this court’s review of the petition."  The show cause order identified 7 separate problematic issues.  The court was wholly unsatisfied with Claimant's response.  "In his response, [Claimant]’s attorney failed to directly address any of the issues raised.  Most significantly, there was no explanation as to why [Claimant] never requested under oath that the JCC be disqualified, nor how [Claimant] was prejudiced by his attorney not being permitted to participate in a telephone conference when it had been rescheduled so that he could participate.  There was also no explanation for [Claimant] seeking relief in the form of a blanket disqualification of the JCC in that the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that such requests will not be granted."

    The court indicated that it wished to see the fees assessed solely against Lawyer:  "Although we would prefer to exclude [Claimant] from this sanction, section 57.105 does not authorize this court to fashion such a remedy.  This cause is remanded to the JCC to determine a reasonable fee and whether [Claimant] should be accorded an opportunity to obtain conflict-free counsel."  Skarka v. Lennar Homes, Inc./Broadspire, 29 So.3d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Civil theft judgment against lawyer who left law firm and took clients with him is reversed, despite conduct called "loathsome" by DCA.  [Added 2/10/10]

    A case that the appeals court described as having facts "enough to make any legal ethics professor cringe" involved the situation of a lawyer departing a law firm and taking clients with him.  Winters, an associate at Mulholland's law firm, left the firm.  Twelve of the firm's "lucrative" clients went with Winters.  Winters had copied or kept some client files. Before Winters left, his "paramour" (a paralegal at the firm) hacked into the firm's computer system and "altered client contact data for some of the clients assigned to Winters to make it more difficult for Mulholland to contact these clients."  (Footnote omitted.)

    Mulholland sued Winters for civil RICO, federal RICO, civil theft, conversion, intentional interference with advantageous business relationships, accounting, and extinguishment of retaining liens.  Ultimately only the civil theft claim was submitted to the jury.  A judgment against Winters was entered for more than $1.4 million.

    Winters appealed.  The Second DCA reversed, ruling that Mulholland "failed to prove that any of Winters' actions were the proximate cause of any damages suffered by Mulholland."

    Although the court had "no real question" that Winters' activities in connection with leaving the firm "constitute the unauthorized use of Mulholland's client files, misappropriation, fraud, and deception," in order to recover on his civil theft claim Mulholland had to also prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was injured "by reason of any violation" of the theft statutes.  F.S. sec. 772.11 (2001).  In the view of the appellate court, Mulholland failed to satisfy his burden of proof.  "For example, Mulholland presented no evidence that any client chose to leave Mulholland and go with Winters because Winters had a copy of their file."  Additionally, "while the alterations to the client information in the computer system may have affected Mulholland's ability to contact his clients, no client testified that he or she left Mulholland and went with Winters because Mulholland never contacted them."  Furthermore, "Mulholland did not present any evidence to establish that any of the clients left because Winters told them that Mulholland was retiring."  In summary, the lack of evidence of proximate cause was "fatal to Mulholland's civil theft claim."  Winters v. Mulholland, 33 So.3d 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).

Conflict rule governing concurrent representation of clients (RPC 4-1.7) does not permit analysis of whether conflict is "material."  [Added 1/14/10]

    Claimant filed petitions for workers' compensation benefits against both Lincoln/Guarantee and Wentworth/Summit.  Each denied responsibility, with Lincoln/Guarantee alleging that Claimant was a borrowed servant of Wentworth and Wentworth/Summit alleging that Claimant was an employee of Lincoln.  Law Firm represented Wentworth/Summit.  About two months before the final hearing, Guarantee retained Law Firm "to participate in an audit of Lincoln to determine whether the claimant was listed in Lincoln’s payroll submissions and to locate the owner of Lincoln."  When Lincoln/Guarantee's lawyer learned that Law Firm was representing Guarantee, he moved to disqualify Law Firm from representing Wentworth/Summit in the workers' compensation case.  The Judge of Compensation Claims ("JCC") denied the motion, ruling that there was no material conflict.  Lincoln/Guarantee petitioned the First DCA for a writ of certiorari.

    The First DCA granted the petition and vacated the order denying disqualification.  "Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.7 forbids a lawyer from representing two clients in the same matter unless the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the responsibilities to each client and each client consents in writing or on the record.  To disqualify a law firm from concurrently representing a  party whose interests are adverse, a client need only show that an attorney/client relationship exists."  Law Firm conceded that it represented both Lincoln/Guarantee and Wentworth/Summit at the same time.  "[T]he JCC erred in finding that the conflict had to be material.  Rule 4-1.7 leaves no room for a 'materiality' analysis.  When [Law Firm] failed to prove it had the written consent from each client, and failed to prove that the representation of both clients would not adversely affect the responsibilities to each client, the JCC should have granted the motion to disqualify."

    The appellate court quoted the explanation of Fifth DCA in Harvey E. Morse, P.A. v. Clark, 890 So.2d 496, 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), that Rule 4-1.7 is "based on the ethical-concept requirement that a lawyer should act with undivided loyalty for his client and not place himself or herself in a position where a conflicting interest may affect the obligations of an ongoing professional relationship.  . . .  Such unseemly conduct, if permitted, would further erode the public’s regard for the legal profession."  Lincoln Associates & Construction, Inc. v. Wentworth Construction Co., Inc., 26 So.3d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Fourth DCA comments critically on lawyers' professionalism in filing "emergency" motions.  [Added 10/23/09]  --  USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Pembroke Pines MRI, Inc., 24 So.3d 588 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Trial notice is not "a hunting license" to engage in unprofessional behavior, Fifth DCA judge warns.  [Added 9/22/09]  --  Allen v. State, 17 So.3d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

Florida Supreme Court again criticizes prosecutor's closing argument, but it did not rise to level of fundamental error.  [Added 9/1/09]  --  Hayward v. State, 24 So.3d 17 (Fla. 2009).

First DCA imposes appellate attorney's fees against party and her lawyer as sanction under F.S. 57.105.  [Added 7/15/09]  --  Long v. AvMed, 14 So.3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Court may individually assess personal representative for attorney's fees resulting from frivolous litigation, even absent bad faith finding.  [Added 6/21/09]  --  Geary v. Butzel Long, P.C., 13 So.3d 149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Criminal conviction reversed due to prosecution's improper closing argument.  [Added 6/16/09]  --  Fleurimond v. State, 10 So.3d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Despite improper argument that one judge called "outrageous," Third DCA affirms criminal conviction.  [Added 4/28/09]  --  Williams v. State, 10 So.3d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Although criticizing lawyer's conduct as "reprehensible," First DCA reverses section 57.105 attorney's fees sanction.  [Added 4/7/09]  --  Campbell v. Dept. of Business and Professional Regulation, 9 So.3d 59 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Two DCAs criticize professional conduct of lawyers practicing before them.  [Added 12/16/08]  --  Hernandez v. Gil, 998 So.2d 651 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (meritless arguments; knowing when to decline representation or to contact Center for Professionalism or ethics hotline); R.E. v. Dept. of Children and Families, 996 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (filing brief "without a single citation to the record").

Fourth DCA affirms order sanctioning lawyer for bad-faith litigation conduct.  [Added 11/29/08]  --  Shniderman v. Fitness Innovations and Technologies, Inc., 994 So.2d 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Third DCA judge criticizes professionalism of lawyer defending negligence case.  [Added 11/12/08]  --  Gold v. West Flagler Associates, Ltd., 997 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Third DCA reverses dismissal of case that was imposed as sanction for actions of plaintiff's lawyer.  [Added 9/9/08]  --  Burgess v. Pfizer, Inc., 990 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Contempt fine against lawyer for failing to appear at hearing is reversed.  [Added 8/29/08]  --  In re: Matter of Steffens, 988 So.2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Jury verdict is reversed due to counsel's statement during voir dire that he was a "consumer justice attorney" representing an individual rather than a "fancy company."  [Added 8/26/08]  --  Hollenbeck v. Hooks, 993 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

F.S. 57.105 attorney's fees assessed against lawyer and clients for filing disqualification motion as "litigation tactic."  [Added 8/13/08]  --  Yang Enterprises, Inc. v. Georgalis, 988 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Expressing skepticism regarding some motions to dismiss alleging fraud on the court, Fifth DCA reverses dismissal order entered without evidentiary hearing.  [Added 7/8/08]  --  Bologna v. Schlanger, 995 So.2d 526 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Lawyer who failed to appear at court-ordered mediation is sanctioned by court and referred to Florida Bar.  [Added 6/18/08]  --  Mojzisik v. Estrada, 983 So.2d 699 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Fourth DCA is critical of criminal defense counsel's argument concerning state's conduct.  [Added 6/18/08]  --  State v. Martin, 982 So.2d 1288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Lawyer's conduct before judge is criticized, but finding that lawyer was guilty of direct criminal contempt is reversed.  [Added 5/13/08]  --  Wiggs v. State, 981 So.2d 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Lawyer ordered to show cause why he should not be sanctioned for filing improper motion for rehearing and clarification.  [Added 5/5/08]  --  Ayala v. Gonzalez, 984 So.2d 523 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Trial court's order granting summary judgment is reversed due to "incompetence" of party's original lawyer.  [Added 4/8/08]  --  Olesh v. Greenberg, 978 So.2d 238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Verdict for slip-and-fall plaintiff is reversed due to "improper and unprofessional" argument and trial conduct by plaintiff's counsel.  [Added 2/19/08]  --  SDG Dadeland Associates, Inc. v. Anthony, 979 So.2d 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Fifth DCA criticizes conduct of lawyers involved in placing irrelevant, prejudicial evidence before jury.  [Added 1/10/08]  --  Williams v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc., 973 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

First DCA imposes attorney's fees under Fla.Stat. sec. 61.16(1) against appellant for filing frivolous appeal in domestic relations matter.  [Added 11/30/07]  --  Lahodik v. Lahodik, 969 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Questioned fee arrangement does not result in reversal of conviction, but defense counsel's handling of murder weapon does.  [Added 11/14/07]  --  Alessi v. State, 969 So.2d 430 (Fla. 5th DCA, 2007).

Lawyer has no legal duty to stop someone from illegally taping conversation, but could face liability for disclosing or using tape.  [Added 10/29/07]  --  Horning-Keating v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 969 So.2d 412 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).   NOTE:  See also Dreggors v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, ___ So.2d ___, 32 Fla.L.Weekly D2727 (Fla. 5th DCA, Nos. 5D05-4047, 5D05-4048, 5D05-4049, 5D05-4050, 5D06-620, 5D06-621, 5D06-622, 5D06-623, 11/16/2007), 2007 WL 3390888.

"Highly improper, unprofessional argument" results in reversal of criminal conviction.  [Added 9/20/07]  --  Chavers v. State, 964 So.2d 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Fifth DCA chastises lawyer who filed motion for rehearing on the basis that she did not understand reason for court's per curiam affirmance.  [Added 8/24/07]  --  Lowry v. State, 963 So.2d 321 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Second DCA reminds lawyers to present facts and law "in an accurate and forthright manner."  [Added 6/14/07]  --  Brown v. State, 958 So.2d 1029 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Lawyer commended for candor in seeking amount of fees orally agreed to rather than amount provided in written co-counsel contract  [Added 4/6/07]  --  Jay v. Trazenfeld, 952 So.2d 635 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Trial court abused discretion by denying motion for new trial based on non-disclosure by juror (who happened to be a lawyer) of her personal litigation history.  [Added 4/4/07]  --  Pereda v. Parajon, 957 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Judge did not err by allowing jurors to continue deliberations until after midnight over defense counsel's objection; lawyers criticized for unrealistic assessment of time required.  [3/15/07]  --  Green v. State, 951 So.2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Fifth DCA cautions against "patently overbroad" discovery requests and urges lawyers to work together to "reasonably narrow" disputed discovery issues.  [Added 1/23/07]  --  Life Care Centers of America v. Reese, 948 So.2d 830 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

"Offensive remarks" and accusations contained in appellate briefs lead to award of Fla.Stat. sec. 57.105 attorney's fees against lawyer.  [9/18/06]  --  Thomas v. Patton, 939 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Lawyer commended for professionalism in candidly accepting blame for conduct leading to imposition of sanctions.  [Added 5/8/06]  --  Doorstep Beverages of Longwood, Inc. v. Collier, 928 So.2d 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (on rehearing).

In appropriate case, appellee or its counsel may be sanctioned by appellate court for defending "indefensible" order of trial court.  [Added 7/29/05]  --  Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2005).

Fourth DCA criticizes lawyers' professionalism in 2 unrelated cases.  [Added 6/10/2005]  --  Giron v. Fairways of Sunrise Homeowners' Association, Inc., 903 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Siegel v. Boca Chase Property Owners' Association, Inc., 904 So.2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).