Motion to disqualify judge for denying continuance and “demeanor” with counsel properly denied as legally insufficient.  [Added 12/20/11]

    Criminal Defendant changed counsel “at least four times” prior to trial.  The trial court held a calendar call on the Thursday, with trial set for the following Monday.  Defendant’s counsel sought a continuance based on “paperwork” problems with the Judicial Administrative Commission regarding payment for deposition transcripts, and the State did not object.  The trial court, however, was determined to start the trial on Monday.  On the day of trial, just prior to jury selection defense counsel informed the court regarding an alleged lack of time to review some transcripts.  Nevertheless, jury selection went forward and was completed at 8 pm that evening.

    The next morning defense counsel filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, alleging that the court’s failure to grant a continuance “along with [the court’s] demeanor with undersigned counsel ha[d] caused the Defendant to reasonably fear that he [would] not get a fair and impartial trial.”  The trial court denied the motion as legally insufficient.  Defendant was tried and convicted.  He appealed, contending that the court erred in denying the motions for continuance and disqualification.

    The Fourth DCA affirmed.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for continuance.  Defendant had changed counsel at least 4 times and had received prior continuances, and defense counsel assented to the court’s proposal to deal with the delays in obtaining transcripts.  “[Defendant’s] own actions and those of his private counsel of choice were responsible for the lack of adequate preparation time, if any.”

    Furthermore, the motion to disqualify the judge was legally insufficient.  “[T]he trial court’s denial of a continuance is not a sufficient legal ground for judicial disqualification.  . . .  [Defendant]’s other allegation that the trial judge’s ‘demeanor with undersigned counsel’ had caused him ‘to reasonably fear that he [would] not get a fair and impartial trial’ was also legally insufficient because [Defendant] failed to specifically describe any facts regarding the trial court’s demeanor.”  (Citations omitted.)  In short, “none of the allegations raised in the motion established an objectionably reasonable basis for [Defendant] to fear the judge was biased.”  Ramos v. State, __ So.3d ___, 36 Fla.L.Weekly D2735 (Fla. 4^th DCA, No. 4D09-4723, 12/14/2011), 2011 WL 6183482.

Criminal conviction reversed because court abused its discretion in denying motion to substitute counsel and for short continuance.  [Added 12/20/11]

    Defendant was represented by the public defender’s office.  He subsequently retained private counsel, Skier, who on the day of trial “addressed the court and informed it that the day before [Defendant], who had been represented by the public defender to that point, hired Skier to represent him in the matter.  Skier noted that he had filed a notice of appearance, a motion to substitute counsel, and a motion for continuance. He requested a thirty to forty-five day continuance to see if the case could be worked out with the prosecutor or to prepare for trial.  The state objected, stating that it was prepared to go to trial that day.”  The State did not assert that it would be prejudiced by a delay.

    The court briefly inquired about the history of the case.  Without further inquiry, the court denied the motion for substitution.  The trial began, with Defendant represented by the public defender.  Defendant was convicted.  On appeal, he argued that the court erred in denying the motion.

    The Fourth DCA reversed.  The trial court made no finding that the motion was made in bad faith.  The case had been pending for 10 months and set for trial just 2 weeks earlier.  There was no evidence of delay by Defendant.  The court denied the motion without questioning Defendant about why he wanted to change lawyers and without offering him the option of self-representation.  “While the constitutional right to have counsel of one’s own choosing represent a defendant at trial  may yield to considerations of the administration of justice, not every request to substitute counsel on the eve of trial may sufficiently impact those considerations such that a request may be denied without inquiry and without the court making proper findings to show that the defendant’s constitutional right is not being arbitrarily denied.  Here, without such findings, we must find that the trial court abused its discretion.”  Alvarez v. State, __ So.3d ___, 36 Fla.L.Weekly D2737 (Fla. 4^th DCA, No. 4D09-4048, 12/14/2011), 2011 WL 6183481.

In unusual case, Third DCA sanctions debtors and their counsel for abusing the legal process in a mortgage foreclosure case.  [Added 6/28/11]  --  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Hernandez, __ So.3d ___, 36 Fla.L.Weekly D1328 (Fla. 3d DCA, No. 3D10-1099, 6/22/2011), 2011 WL 2499641.

Court erred in imposing sanctions on party due to conduct of its expert witness.  [Added 2/8/11]  --  State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swindoll, 54 So.3d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

Court erred in forbidding party from calling any witnesses other than herself and from introducing documents due to her lawyer's conduct.  [Added 2/5/11]  --  Cossio v. Arrondo, 53 So.3d 1141 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

Fifth DCA orders lawyer to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for filing improper motion for rehearing.  [Added 1/15/11]  --  Marion v. Orlando Pain & Medical Rehabilitation, 67 So.3d 264 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

Per Florida Supreme Court, party whose objections to lawyer misconduct at trial are sustained must move for mistrial to preserve issue for motion for new trial.  [Added 12/17/10]  --  Companioni v. City of Tampa, 51 So.3d 452 (Fla. 2010).

Rules of Judicial Administration do not require lawyer to disclose names of persons who own and control lawyer's corporate clients.  [Added 12/17/10]  --  Empire World Towers, LLC v. CDR Creances, S.A.S., 48 So.3d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Fifth DCA approves sanctions against parties and their counsel after the parties failed to appear at court-ordered mediation.  [Added 12/9/10]  --  Mash v. Lugo, 49 So.3d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Court erred in denying continuance where party was unemployed and her counsel  withdrew on eve of trial.  [Added 12/3/10]  --  Quintero v. Kenyon, 49 So.3d 808 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Fourth DCA urges Supreme Court to allow trial courts to sanction attorneys for reckless misconduct, not just bad faith.  [Added 11/5/10]  --  Rivero v. Meister, 46 So.3d 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Court's failure to inquire into defense counsel's potential conflict is not subject to harmless error rule.  [Added 9/14/10]  --  Hannah v. State, 42 So.3d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Third DCA reverses substantial verdict based on improper argument by plaintiff's counsel.  [Added 9/1/10]  --  Fasani v. Kowalski, 43 So.3d 805 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Fourth DCA criticizes lawyers for failure to comply with candor-toward-the-tribunal rule.  [Added 8/31/10]  --  Dept. of Children and Families v. D.B.D., 42 So.3d 916 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Fourth DCA reverses criminal conviction due to prosecutor's improper closing argument.  [Added 8/19/10]  --  Wicklow v. State, 43 So.3d 85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

Third DCA reverses another substantial verdict due to improper argument by same lawyer.  [Added 8/16/10]  --  Chin v. Caiaffa, 42 So.3d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

JCC does not have statutory authority to strip employer/carrier of defenses on ground that its lawyer engaged in fraudulent conduct.  [Added 6/1/10]  --  McArthur v. Mental Health Care, Inc./Summit Claims Center, 35 So.3d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Lawyers and client sanctioned for appealing non-appealable order, and court notes that client may have conflict-free counsel when sanction amount is determined on remand.  [Added 5/19/10]  --  Maradriaga v. 7-Eleven, 35 So.3d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

First DCA imposes 57.105 fees against party and his lawyer who sought certiorari review after unsworn motion to disqualify JCC was denied.  [Added 3/5/10]  --  Skarka v. Lennar Homes, Inc./Broadspire, 29 So.3d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Trial court erred by assessing costs against State Attorney's Office as sanction for criminal case discovery violation.  [Added 2/17/10]  --  State v. Nelson, 27 So.3d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010).

Florida Supreme Court vacates death sentence due to prosecutorial misconduct.  [Added 1/20/10]  --  Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 51 (Fla. 2010) (revised opinion).

Despite improper argument that one judge called "outrageous," Third DCA affirms criminal conviction.  [Added 4/28/09]  --  Williams v. State, 10 So.3d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).

Third DCA reverses dismissal of case that was imposed as sanction for actions of plaintiff's lawyer.  [Added 9/9/08]  --  Burgess v. Pfizer, Inc., 990 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Comments by insurer's lawyer concerning allegedly fraudulent workers' compensation claim were non-actionable as statements of pure opinion.   [Added 8/26/08]  --  Dreggors v. Wausau Ins. Co., 995 So.2d 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Jury verdict reversed due to counsel's statement during voir dire that he was "consumer justice attorney" representing an individual rather than a "fancy company."  [Added 8/26/08]  --  Hollenbeck v. Hooks, 993 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Verdict for slip-and-fall plaintiff is reversed due to "improper and unprofessional" argument and trial conduct by plaintiff's counsel.  [Added 2/19/08]  --  SDG Dadeland Associates, Inc. v. Anthony, 979 So.2d 997 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008).

Defense verdict in slip and fall case reversed due in part to counsel's argument that violated Rule of Professional Conduct 4-3.4(e).  [Added 12/30/2007]  --  Ventimiglia v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 980 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Two DCAs address discovery orders involving attorneys who wished to view or videotape neuropsychological examinations of their clients.  [Added 9/14/07]  --  Florida Department of Transportation v. Piccolo, 964 So.2d 773 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Bacallao v. Dauphin, 963 So.2d 962 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (on rehearing).

Although condemned by Florida Supreme Court as improper, counsel's argument in tobacco case did not rise to level of reversible error.  [Added 12/21/06]  --  Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (revised opinion).

Reasonable misunderstanding between lawyers regarding settlement negotiations constitutes "excusable neglect" sufficient to vacate default judgment; in this case, seeking default without notice was unethical.  [Added 12/8/06]  --   Gables Club Marina, LLC v. The Gables Condominium and Club Association, Inc., 948 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Alleged repeated but mostly unobjected-to violations of ethics rules against improper jury argument did not warrant granting of new trial.  [Added 10/27/06]  --  Bradley v. Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc., 943 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Lawyers who change addresses should file notice of the change in each active litigation file.  [Added 10/24/06]  --  Richardson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 941 So.2d 435 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

Plaintiff had responsibility to do own investigation before naming Fabre defendant, and could not rely on assertions of opponent to avoid Fla.Stat. sec 57.105 fee award.  [Added 8/2/06]  --  Yakavonis v. Dolphin Petroleum, Inc., 934 So.2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Prosecutor's Biblical reference during cross-examination did not constitute fundamental error, per Florida Supreme Court.  [Added 7/7/06]  --  Farina v. State, 937 So.2d 612 (Fla. 2006).

Lawyer sanctioned for phoning in to mediation rather than personally appearing as ordered.  [Added 2/28/06]  --  Hernando County School Board v. Nazar, 920 So.2d 794 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Supreme Court eliminated distinction between "active" and "passive" record activity for purposes of determining dismissal for failure to prosecute.  Wilson v. Salamon, 923 So.2d 363 (Fla. 2005).

In appropriate case, appellee or its counsel may be sanctioned by appellate court for defending "indefensible" order of trial court.  Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 912 So.2d 561 (Fla. 2005).

Lawyer's false representations to client about case's progress were not "good cause" to prevent dismissal for lack of prosecution.  Havens v. Chambliss, 906 So.2d 318 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Where appropriate, case may be dismissed with prejudice as sanction for lawyer's conduct even without client's involvement.  Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492 (Fla. 2004).

Equitable tolling doctrine not applicable despite lawyer's failure to immediately move to dismiss case filed by opposing counsel in wrong firm.  HCA Health Services of Florida v. Hillman, 906 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Lawyer's decision to assist another lawyer on last day of limitations period was not "emergency" warranting equitable tolling of statute.  Williams v. Albertson's, Inc., 879 So.2d 657 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Series of "willful" discovery violations that "substantially prejudiced" defendant supports trial court's dismissal of criminal information.  State v. Gillis, 876 So.2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Cumulative effect of counsel's objected-to remarks requires reversal of $3 million jury verdict.  Bocher v. Glass, 874 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Where discovery violations resulting in sanction of dismissal with prejudice were solely due to lawyer, dismissal reversed as too severe.  Jimenez v. Simon, 879 So.2d 13, 29 Fla.L.Weekly D1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).  NOTE:  The Fifth DCA recently reached a similar conclusion in American Express Co. v. Hickey, 869 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5^th DCA 2004).  See also Rohlwing v. Myakka River Real Properties, Inc., 884 So.2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (dismissal with prejudice reversed because trial court did not make findings required by Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1993)).

Client's absence from defense counsel's ex parte disclosure to court of counsel's concerns about his ability (due to anticipated bar complaint and client perjury) to be effective violated client's due process rights.  Frett v. State, 864 So.2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

Lawyer's suspension for failure to maintain CLE credits is not "good cause" for client's failure to prosecute case.  Orsonio v. Fuller, Mallah and Associates, 857 So.2d 973 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).