Lawyer appointed from "Involuntary Appointment List" to represent defendant in complex RICO prosecution should have been permitted to withdraw.  [Added 8/18/09]

    Defendant and a number of his alleged fellow gang members in Manatee County were charged with racketeering under RICO statutes.  Due to a conflict of interest, the circuit court could not appoint the public defender or the Office of Criminal Conflict Civil Regional Counsel to represent Defendant.  Accordingly, the circuit court created an "Involuntary Appointment List."  Lawyer was among the local attorneys placed on the list.  Two other attorneys were first appointed to represent Defendant, but each was granted leave to withdraw.  Lawyer was then appointed.  Lawyer moved to withdraw, but the court denied the motion.  Concerned about the effect of the appointment on Lawyer's practice but viewing the need to find counsel for Defendant as paramount, the circuit court fashioned a "detailed plan" under which Lawyer would be compensated for representing Defendant.

    Lawyer then petitioned the Second DCA for certiorari.  Lawyer asserted 4 arguments in support of his petition.  "First, the involuntary appointment of [Lawyer] to [Defendant]'s case results in a significant burden to [Lawyer] that is not only confiscatory of his time but also compromises his ability to provide ethical and competent representation to the client.  Second, the financial burden imposed on [Lawyer] by the appointment is so great that it creates an inherent conflict between him and [Defendant].  Third, whether [Lawyer] is forced into a contract with the JAC under the circuit court's order or is to be paid under the provisions of section 27.5304 [establishing maximum statutory fees for appointed counsel, but providing for "complicated and time-consuming procedures for obtaining a fee in excess of the statutory maximum"], the circuit court's order violates [Lawyer]'s constitutional right of contract under article I, section 10 of the Florida Constitution.  Finally, the involuntary appointment violates various other constitutional rights, including equal protection, due process of law, and the right of association."

    The appellate court granted Lawyer's petition.  "Because we agree that [Lawyer] established grounds to withdraw under rule 4-6.2 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, we need not address his constitutional arguments."  (The court noted that the Florida Supreme Court rejected similar constitutional arguments in In re Amendments to Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-1-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Adminstration-2.065 (Legal Aid), 573 So.2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1990).)

    The court observed that RICO actions such as the one facing Defendant are extremely complex and burdensome, and that "the practice of law has changed dramatically since the 1930s when the fictional Atticus Finch practiced law" (and defended an unpopular accused without mention of a fee).  The court concluded that Lawyer's continued representation of Defendant would result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See Rule 4-6.2(a).  "Here, the undisputed evidence established that the involuntary appointment to [Defendant]'s case would make it impossible for [Lawyer] to handle the legal business of his existing clients and provide them with competent representation.  Such derelictions by [Lawyer] would result in the violation of rules 4-1.1, 4-1.2(a), 4-1.3, and 4-1.4.  Under these circumstances, [Lawyer] established good cause for moving to withdraw from [Defendant]'s case.  See In re Amendments, 573 So.2d at 806; ABA Formal Op. 06-441 at 4-5."

    Additionally, the continued representation would place "an unreasonable financial burden on" Lawyer.  See Rule 4-6.2(b).  "When a lawyer is required to work exclusively on a single client's business for an extended period of time, work for existing clients must generally be postponed or  referred to other attorneys.  While the lawyer is working exclusively on one client's affairs, it is difficult -- if not impossible -- to accept new business.  For such work on behalf of a single client performed on a 'crash basis,' the lawyer ought to receive a premium above his or her normal fee to compensate for the disruption to the lawyer's practice.  See Mark W. Klingensmith, Attorney-Client Relationship § 1.19, in Florida Civil Practice Before Trial (Fla. Bar CLE 8th ed. 2009); see also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(b)(1)(B) ('Factors to be considered as guides in determining a reasonable fee include . . . the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.').  The circumstances of the involuntary appointment of [Lawyer] to [Defendant]'s case turn basic law office economics on its head by requiring [Lawyer] to work for one client on a 'crash basis' at a rate substantially below the market rate for similar services."  Hagopian v. Justice Administrative Commission, 18 So.3d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

Law firm's effort to withdraw from case in response to motion to disqualify may not remedy problem.  [Added 4/2/09]  --  Lewis v. Nical of Palm Beach, Inc., 10 So.3d 159 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Regional Conflict Counsel has no standing to object to Public Defender's motion to withdraw from a case on conflict grounds.  [Added 3/20/09]  --  Johnson v. State, 6 So.3d 1262 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Lawyer who withdrew from contingent fee case for health reasons may not have forfeited his right to fee.  [Added 11/1/07]  --  Collier v. Bohnet, 966 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Defense counsel's "nodding acquaintance" with key state witness was not conflict of interest requiring counsel's withdrawal; defense counsel did not err in failing to withdraw; RPC 4-3.5(d)(4) constitutional.  [Added 10/17/07]  --  Kormondy v. State, 983 So.2d 418 (Fla. 2007).

Second DCA outlines procedure for lawyers to follow when withdrawing from or appearing in cases already on appeal.  In re P.G., 944 So.2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).  NOTE:  See also S.H. v. Department of Children and Family Services, 955 So.2d 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).

Client's absence from defense counsel's ex parte disclosure to court of counsel's concerns about his ability to be effective (due to anticipated bar complaint and client perjury) violated client's due process rights.  Frett v. State, 864 So.2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).